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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal from a
final Order of the Industrial Commission (the "Commission")
pursuant to Sections 35-1-82.53, 35-1-86, 63-46b-16 and 78-2a-3
of the Utah Code Ann.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The following issues are presented for review:
(1)

Is there substantial evidence to support the

Commission's finding that Petitioner failed to establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, medical causation between his
industrial accident on May 21, 1976 and his now claimed permanent
total disability?
(2)

Did the Commission err in not applying the "odd lot

doctrine" to Petitioner's claim because it found no medical
causation?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW OF FINDING NO MEDICAL
CAUSATION.

Because these proceedings commenced after January 1, 1988,
the review by this Court is governed by the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act

(UAPA) .x

The Commission determined that Petitioner Gerald Hansen
("Petitioner") failed to prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that his May 21, 1976 industrial injury medically

Sections 63-46b-l e£ seq. of the Utah Code Annotated.

caused his now claimed permanent total disability.2

This Court

has consistently held that " . . . medical causation is an issue
of fact . . ."3

In reviewing a factual finding, this Court will

disturb it only if it is not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before the Court.4
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.5
Petitioner necessarily has the burden of marshalling all of
the evidence showing that, despite the facts, and in light of the
conflicting or contradictory evidence, the Commission's findings
are not supported by substantial evidence.6
B.

STANDARD OF REVIEW OF FINDING THAT THE "ODD
LOT DOCTRINE" DOES NOT APPLY.

Since the interpretation of the "odd lot doctrine", and its
applicability to Petitioner's claim, is a question of law, this

2

R. at 260-263. The decision of the Administrative Law
Judge dated March 3, 1993 is attached as Appendix "A". The
Commission's decision dated May 13, 1994 is attached as Appendix
"B" .
3

Chase v. Industrial Commission, 872 P.2d 475 (Utah App.
1994) .
Commercial Carriers and Old Republic Insurance v.
Industrial Commission of Utah, 255 Utah Adv. Rep. 57 (Utah App.
1994) ; a copy of Commercial Carriers and Old Republic Insurance
v. Industrial Commission of Utah, supra, is attached as Appendix
"C" .
5

Chase v. Industrial Commission, supra.

6

King v. Industrial Commission, 850 P.2d 1281 (Utah App.
1993) .
2

Court's review is under a correction of error standard, giving no
deference t : • t:l 1 s Coi i: tin :i ssi on* s deed si on. 7
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
This case does not ii 1 v ol v e the interpretation of a statute,
ordinance, r u l ^ or regulation.
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7.

Petitioner never returned to work for the City.
Petitioner cannot recall why he discontinued working for the
City and what efforts he made or could have made to continue
working in 1977.

Interestingly, on May 24, 1977, the orthopedic

surgeon, who performed Petitioner's ankle and knee surgery, wrote
a letter to the City stating that Petitioner could return to
light duty work operating a motor vehicle.
On June 17, 1977, Petitioner filed a claim for worker's
compensation benefits with the Commission.

A hearing was held

before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on September 19, 1977.
The ALJ referred the matter to a medical panel.

The medical

panel report issued on March 21, 1978 stated that Petitioner had
a total impairment related to his industrial accident of 16%
whole person.

Petitioner did not, however, at any time during

the 1978 proceeding, claim permanent total disability.
In 1982, Petitioner filed a second Application for Hearing
with the Commission.

The matter was again referred to a medical

panel which rated Petitioner's physical impairment related to the
1976 accident at 14% whole person.

The Commission denied

permanent partial impairment benefits to Petitioner because the
14% rating was less than the 16% rating he received and was
compensated for in 1977.

The 1982 medical panel also found that

Petitioner had pulmonary (respiratory) problems due to a tumor
which was unrelated causally to the industrial accident on May
21, 1976.

At no time during the 1982 proceeding before the

Commission did Petitioner claim permanent total disability.
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right extremity.11
2.

Petitioner was 47 years old on the date of the

industrial accident.12
3.

Petitioner had surgery on his right ankle on May 21,

1976.13
4.

On September 8, 1976, Petitioner had left knee surgery

which was determined to be related to the 1976 industrial
accident.14
5.

In mid-January 1977, Petitioner returned to work with

the City performing his normal work duties.15
6.

On or about February 4, 1977, Petitioner, while at work

for the City, was carrying a bundle of chainlink fencing when his
left knee and right foot gave way causing him to fall to the
ground.16
7.

It is not clear whether or not Petitioner actually

caused any aggravation to his left knee on February 4, 1977 but
he did not return to work after that incident.17
8.

H

Petitioner did not recall why he discontinued working

R . at 173.

12

R. at 173.

13

R. at 173.

14

R. at 173.

15

R. at 173.

16

R. at 173.

17

R. at 174.
6
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1977.21
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,24

•_
r September

1977.25
16.

The matter was referred to a medical panel.

The

medical panel report, issued on March 21, 1978, recommended an
impairment rating for Petitioner's right foot and left knee at
16% whole person.26
17.

On May 10, 1978, the ALJ issued Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Order awarding Petitioner temporary total
compensation and permanent partial impairment benefits based on
the 16% whole person rating.

There was no claim or award for

permanent total disability.27
18.

On September 29, 1977, the Social Security

Administration denied Petitioner's claim for disability benefits
stating that Petitioner was capable of doing light duty work.28
19.

On October 31, 1977, Petitioner filed a request for

reconsideration with the Social Security Administration.29
20.

On December 13, 1977, the Social Security

Administration again denied disability benefits to Petitioner.30
21.

On January 27, 1978, Petitioner filed a request for

'R. at 175.
'R. at 175.
r

R. at 175.

;

R. at 175, 176.

*R. at 175, 176.
>R. at 175, 176.
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hearing on Uie denial of his Social Security benefits.31
22.
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On November 12, 1979, Petitioner underwent a second

knee surgery.
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16% rating by the medical panel in 1977.36
29.

The ALJ ruled that Petitioner was not entitled to any

additional benefits, other than temporary total compensation,
since his 1982 permanent partial impairment rating due to his
1976 industrial accident was less than the rating given to him in
1977.37
30.

The 1982 medical panel also found that Petitioner had

pulmonary (respiratory) problems that were due to a tumor which
may have been present as early as the date of the 1976 industrial
injury but was unrelated causally to the industrial accident.38
31.

From October 1980 through March of 1982, Petitioner was

seeking care at the VA Hospital for pulmonary related problems.39
32.

At the time, Petitioner was a 40-50 pack per year

smoker.40
33.

In November 1982, a medical report was issued

indicating that Petitioner had increased arthritis in his foot
joints.41
34.

In December 1982, a medical report stated that

Petitioner's complaints were out of proportion to the examination

36

R. at 177.

37

R. at 177.

38

R. at 185.

39

R. at 184.

40

R. at 184.

41

R. at 177.
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findings .42
35.

On January 11, 1983, Petitioner's Social Security

benefits were discontinued because it was determined that
Petitioner could do other work.43
36.

On March 7, 1983, Petitioner filed a Request for

Reconsideration with the Social Security Administration and on
October 26, 1983, his Social Security benefits were reinstated.44
37.

From 1981 through the present, Petitioner received

continual care from the VA Hospital for chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease.45
38.

In late 1991, Petitioner filed a claim for permanent

total disability.46
39.

After a hearing, the ALJ referred the Petitioner's

claim to a medical panel.47
40.

The medical panel found that Petitioner had the

following whole person impairments:
a.

17% for the right ankle and the left knee which is

attributable to the 1976 accident;
b.

2% for the left ankle, 10% for the low back and 1%

42

R. at 177.

43

R. at 177.

44

R. at 178.

45

R. at 178 and 185, 186.

46

R. at 191.

47

R. at 171.
11

for the macular degeneration all of which are not
attributable to the 1976 accident; and
c.

40% for the pulmonary (respiratory) condition

which is not attributable to the 1976 accident.48
39.

On March 18, 1993, the ALJ issued her Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Order stating the following:
a.

The 4 0% whole person rating that the medical panel

assessed for Petitioner's (pulmonary) respiratory condition
makes it clear that the condition is the most significant
impairment that Petitioner has currently.49
b.

Due to the significant time delay between the

Petitioner's discontinuance of work and his filing of the
permanent total disability claim, information regarding what
was happening in 1977 for the Petitioner is very "sparse".50
c.

Petitioner recalls very little about why he

discontinued working and what efforts he made, or could have
made, to continue working in 1977.51
d.

The ALJ does not feel she has very accurate

information on which to make a determination as to what
caused the Petitioner to discontinue working in 1977.52

48

R. at 188.

49

R. at 190.

50

R. at 191.

51

R. at 191.

52

R. at 192.

12

e.

Due to the significant time delay between the

Petitioner's discontinuance of work with the City and his
filing of a permanent total disability claim, the City and
the Division of Rehabilitation need not offer rehabilitation
in 1991 because Petitioner has developed a post-injury
significant pulmonary (respiratory) condition, is now nearly
retirement age and has not worked for the past sixteen years
(1977 to 1993) .53
f.

There is indication in the medical records that

the Petitioner might have been able to perform some kind of
work in 1977, notwithstanding the knee and ankle
impairments.54
g.

In 1977, the Petitioner might have been able to

return to some kind of work had he sought or been offered
some minimal new training.55
h.

There is a lack of evidence, due to the delay in

filing the permanent total disability claim, as to whether
Petitioner was susceptible to rehabilitation.56
i.

Based primarily on the Social Security disability

records, the ALJ determines that the Petitioner has been
disabled since the date of his 1976 industrial injury to the

53

R. at 191.

The decision of ALJ was issued in 1993.

54

R. at 191, 192.

55

R. at 192.

56

R. at 192.
13

present.57
j.

The ALJ finds that the primary cause of the

Petitioner's permanent total disability during the past
sixteen years has been the left knee and right ankle
impairments sustained in the May 21, 1976 industrial
accident .58
40.

On May 13, 1994, the Commission issued an Order denying

Petitioner's claim for permanent total disability stating the
following:
a.

The Commission adopts the Findings of Fact set

forth in the ALJ's decision.59
b.

The Commission does not know: (1) the underlying

facts upon which the Social Security Administration made its
award; (2) whether those facts are supported by the
evidence; and (3) whether it applied the appropriate legal
principles required by the Utah Worker's Compensation laws
in making its determination.

The Commission, therefore,

does not place its primary reliance on the Social Security
determination.
c.

In 1977, Petitioner received a 16% permanent

partial impairment rating for his industrial injuries
sustained in a 1976 accident.

R. at 192.
;

R. at 193.

>

R. at 260.
14

The 16% impairment rating

attributable to his 1976 industrial accident remained
virtually unchanged in sixteen years although his physical
impairment due to non-industrial conditions, such as his
pulmonary (respiratory)
d.

problems, increased.60

Petitioner did not actually return to work with

the City after 1977.

His failure, however, to return to

work may be attributable to reasons other than his injury
and is, therefore, given little weight.61
e.

Petitioner's treating physician released him to

return to light duty work in 1977.62
f.

Petitioner filed two separate claims for worker's

compensation benefits within a few years of the 1976
accident, but at no time during the proceedings before the
Commission did he claim to be permanently totally
disabled.63
g.

Shortly after his 1976 accident, Petitioner began

suffering pulmonary (respiratory) and other assorted medical
problems, which had been appraised by a medical panel as
much more significant and debilitating than his industrial
injury.64

60

R. at 261.

61

R. at 261.

62

R. at 261.

63

R. at 261.

64

R. at 261.
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41.

In view of the record before it, the Commission ruled

that Petitioner had failed to prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that his 1976 industrial injury medically caused his
now claimed permanent total disability.65
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The City argues that the Commission correctly determined
that Petitioner failed to meet his burden of demonstrating
medical causation between an accident on May 21, 1976 and his now
claimed permanent total disability.

There is substantial

evidence in the record to support the Commission's determination,
including the following:
1.

There is no evidence to indicate why Petitioner

discontinued his employment with the City in 1977.

A medical

report prepared by Petitioner's physician in 1977 stated that he
could do light duty work.
2.

Petitioner filed claims for worker's compensation

benefits in 1977 and 1982.

In both proceedings, he at no time,

claimed permanent total disability.
3.

The permanent partial disability attributable to

Petitioner's industrial accident in 1976 remained virtually
unchanged for the fifteen years prior to Petitioner's application
for permanent total disability.
4.

Petitioner's subsequent

pulmonary (respiratory)

condition, which is not attributable to the industrial accident,

"R. at 261.
16

caused Petitioner's permanent total disability.
5.

The ALJ should not have relied primarily on the Social

Security Administration determination regarding Petitioner's
permanent total disability.
Further, the City argues that the "odd lot doctrine" does
not apply because the Commission properly found no medical
causation between Petitioner's 1976 industrial injury and his now
claimed permanent total disability.
Finally, the City argues that it is the Commission, not the
ALJ, who is the ultimate fact finder.

The Commission's findings

are of sufficient detail that this Court can discern its logical
process in finding no medical causation.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT PETITIONER FAILED
TO PROVE, BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE#
MEDICAL CAUSATION BETWEEN HIS INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT ON MAY 21, 1976 AND HIS 1991 CLAIMED
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY.
A.

MEDICAL CAUSATION IS A FACTUAL MATTER.

Petitioner argues that the Commission erred in finding that
he failed to meet his burden of demonstrating medical causation
between an accident on May 21, 1976 and his now claimed permanent
total disability.
This Court has consistently held that "medical causation is
a 'factual matter1".66

Petitioner has the burden to prove

66

Chase v. Influstrifll Cpmrniggion, guprfl at 479.
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medical causation by a preponderance of the evidence.67

This

Court reviews the Commission's factual findings under the
substantial evidence standard.68
Substantial evidence is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.69
B.

THE COMMISSION'S FINDING OF NO MEDICAL
CAUSATION IS SUPPORTED BY RELEVANT EVIDENCE
AS A REASONABLE MIND MIGHT ACCEPT AS ADEQUATE
TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION.

In reviewing the whole record, there is substantial evidence
to support the Commission's finding that Petitioner failed to
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his 1976
industrial accident was the medical cause of his now claimed
total permanent disability.
The industrial accident which Petitioner claims caused his
permanent disability occurred on May 21, 1976.

The injuries he

sustained from the May 21, 1976 industrial accident were to his
right ankle and left knee.70
Petitioner left the employment of the City in 1977.

There

is no evidence, however, which indicates why Petitioner
discontinued his employment with the City.71

The Petitioner did

67

Large v. Industrial Commission. 758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah
App. 1988).
68

Chase v. Industrial Commission, supr^ at 479.

69

Id.

70

Fact H i , 3, 4.

71

Fact 18.
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not recall why he left and what efforts he made, or could have
made to continue working in 1977.

Petitioner's treating

physician, however, stated in 1977, that Petitioner could still
do light duty work.72
The ALJ attributes the lack of evidence to the fifteen year
time delay between the industrial accident and Petitioner's
filing of his claim for permanent total disability.

This Court,

however, stated in Zupon v. Industrial Commission,73 that in
order for a claimant to receive benefits, he or she must first
" . . . prove that he or she can no longer perform the duties
required in his or her occupation. . . . " and that he or she
cannot be rehabilitated.

After the employee has shown that

rehabilitation is not possible, the employer has the opportunity
to prove the existence of steady work the employee can perform.
The time delay of fifteen years does not change Petitioner's
burden as stated in Zupon.74 to prove he could no longer work in
1977 and he could not be rehabilitated.

The lack of evidence

supports the Commission's finding.
In 1977, the Petitioner filed a claim for worker's
compensation benefits.75

The 1977 claim was referred to a

72

Fact 110.

73

Zupon v. Industrial Commission. 860 P.2d 960, 963 (Utah
App. 1993). A copy of Zupon v. Industrial Commission, supra is
attached as Appendix "C".
74

Zupon v. Industrial Commission, supra.

75

Fact 113.
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medical panel which found that Petitioner had a permanent partial
impairment of 16% attributable to his industrial injury.76

There

was no mention by the medical panel or the Petitioner that he was
permanently totally disabled.77

In 1982, Petitioner filed

another claim for benefits with the Commission.78
matter was also referred to a medical panel.

The 1982

The 1982 medical

panel found that Petitioner's impairment related to his
industrial injury was 14% which was less than the finding of the
medical panel in 1977.

Accordingly, Petitioner was not awarded

any benefits in 1982 for permanent partial impairment.79

Again,

Petitioner never asserted that he was permanently totally
disabled and the 1982 medical panel made no mention of such
condition.

The 1982 medical panel did, however, find that

Petitioner had pulmonary (respiratory) problems unrelated to his
1976 industrial accident.
In 1991, fifteen years after the industrial accident,
Petitioner, for the first time, asserts that he is permanently
totally disabled.
panel.

The 1991 claim was referred to a medical

The 1991 medical panel found that Petitioner had total

physical impairment of 70% of the whole person.

The medical

panel, however, determined that only 17% of the total physical

•Fact fl6.
'Fact Ul7.
'Fact 126.
'Facts 1(29.
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impairment was related to the 1976 industrial accident.

The

medical panel attributed 40% of the Petitioner's disability to
his pulmonary (respiratory) problems which were unrelated to his
1976 industrial accident.80
Accordingly, Petitioner's impairment related to his 1976
industrial accident remained essentially unchanged throughout the
sixteen years prior to his claim for permanent total disability.
He received a 16% permanent partial rating in 1977, a 14% rating
in 1982 and a 17% rating in 1992.

Consequently, even though

Petitioner's total physical impairment increased from 16% in 1977
to 70% in 1992, the impairment attributable to the 1976
industrial accident remained virtually unchanged.81

The most

significant impairment that Petitioner had in 1991 was his
pulmonary (respiratory) problems.82
Petitioner had opportunities during the sixteen years, in
two different proceedings before the Commission, to claim
permanent total disability and that he was unable to work after
1977.

He never mentioned permanent total disability until 1991.
Petitioner's most disabling condition and the cause of his

permanent total disability is his pulmonary (respiratory)
impairment.

The 1992 medical panel determined that of his 70%

whole person disability, 40% is related to his pulmonary

80

Facts 14 0.

81

Id.

82

Id.
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(respiratory) condition.

The history regarding Petitioner's

pulmonary (respiratory) condition began in 1976 when Petitioner
was hospitalized for chest pain and a suspected pulmonary
embolus.83

In 1980, Petitioner was seen at the VA Hospital for a

six week cough.

The VA Hospital records indicate that Petitioner

was a 40 to 50 pack a year smoker.84

From October 1980 through

November 1980, Petitioner was hospitalized at the VA Hospital for
an abnormal mass seen on a chest x-ray.85

In 1981, Petitioner

was seen at the VA Hospital for an upper respiratory tract
infection.86

In 1981, Petitioner was provided care at the VA

Hospital for post-surgical thoracic pain, chest wall pain and
acute bronchitis.

In the 1982 proceeding before the Commission,

the medical panel found that Petitioner's pulmonary (respiratory)
problems were due to a tumor which may have been present as early
as 1976 but was unrelated causally to the 1976 industrial
accident.

In 1985, Petitioner was seen at the VA Hospital for

upper respiratory tract infections with sharp pain.

From

December 1987 to January 1988, Petitioner received medical care
at the VA Hospital for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and
chronic bronchitis.87

In 1988, pulmonary function tests were

83

Fact 1|31.

84

Fact H32.

85

R. at 185.

86

R. at 185.

87

Facts 131.
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done at the VA Hospital and it was determined that the Petitioner
had moderate pulmonary obstruction.88

In 1989, Petitioner was

seen at the VA Hospital for an increase in his chronic shortness
of breath.89

In 1989, pulmonary function tests were done at the

VA Hospital and it was again determined that Petitioner had
moderate obstruction.

From March 1989 through April 1989,

Petitioner was inpatient at the VA Hospital due to chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease.90

In June 1989, Petitioner was

seen at the VA Hospital due to acute exacerbations of his chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease.

There is substantial evidence in

the record showing that the cause of Petitioner's permanent total
disability is his pulmonary (respiratory) problems and not the
1976 industrial injury.
Interestingly, the ALJ recognized that the pulmonary
(respiratory) condition was the most significant impairment that
the Petitioner has.91

The ALJ stated that rehabilitation was not

a possibility because Petitioner had developed a significant
post-injury respiratory condition.92
The ALJ relied primarily on the Social Security
Administration decision to support her conclusion that Petitioner

*8R. at 185.
89

ld.

90

Id.

91

Fact H39.

92

Id.
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was permanently totally disabled as a result of the 1976
industrial injury.93

The Social Security Administration,

however, was not concerned about finding a causal connection
between the 1976 industrial injury and permanent total disability
or other legal standards applicable to worker's compensation
benefits.

The Social Security Administration decides only

whether a person is permanently totally disabled.

Further, the

City was not a party to the Social Security Administration
proceeding.

To rely primarily on the Social Security

Administration ruling deprives the City of its right to present
its evidence, cross examine witnesses and otherwise contest the
matter.

There must be evidence other than the Social Security

Administration decision to support a determination that the 1976
industrial injury caused Petitioner's permanent total disability.
The Commission, based upon the Findings of Fact of the ALJ,
was obligated to correct the ALJ's misplacement of the burden of
proof.

The Commission, in applying the proper burden of proof,

determined that Petitioner failed to demonstrate a causal
connection between the 1976 industrial accident and his permanent
total disability.

There is substantial evidence to support the

Commission's conclusion that Petitioner failed to show medical
causation.

Fact 1(3 9.
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POINT II
THE "ODD LOT" DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE
THE COMMISSION PROPERLY FOUND NO MEDICAL
CAUSATION BETWEEN PETITIONER'S 1976
INDUSTRIAL INJURY AND HIS NOW CLAIMED
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY.
Petitioner argues that he is entitled to permanent total
disability benefits based on the "odd lot" doctrine.

The "odd

lot" doctrine allows the Commission to find permanent total
disability when a relatively small percentage of impairment
caused by an industrial accident is combined with other factors
to render a claimant unable to obtain employment.
This Court, however, has consistently held that for the odd
lot doctrine to apply, there must first be medical causation
between the claimant's industrial accident and the claimed
permanent total disability.94

That is different from, and not

controlled in any way by, a determination that the industrial
accident caused a permanent partial disability.95

The standard

of proof for medical causation is by a preponderance of the
evidence.96
The Commission found that Petitioner failed to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that his 1976 industrial injury

94

Zupon v. Indugtrifrl gommigsipn, supra.

95

Id. at 963.

96

Large v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah
App. 1988) .
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medically caused his now claimed permanent total disability.97
Therefore, the odd lot doctrine does not apply and need not be
addressed by this Court.98
In Zupon, this Court reviewed issues, and underlying facts,
similar to those presented by Petitioner.
sustained industrial injuries in 1976.

Claimant Zupon

In 1977, claimant Zupon

received workers' compensation benefits for permanent partial
impairment of 10%.

In 1978, claimant Zupon was awarded

disability benefits by the Social Security Administration.
Subsequently, claimant Zupon had increased problems with his
arthritic condition.
The Commission concluded that claimant Zupon had failed to
establish the necessary medical causation between his 1975
industrial accident and his permanent total disability stating
that his arthritic condition caused his permanent total
disability.

On appeal, claimant Zupon argued that he was

entitled to permanent total disability benefits under the "odd
lot doctrine".
This Court, in Zupon, held that for the "odd lot doctrine"
to apply, the claimant must first show that there is medical
causation between his 1975 industrial accident and his now
claimed permanent total disability.

Fact 1(42.
;

Zupon v. Industrial Commission, supra.
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This Court affirmed the Commission's determination stating
that substantial evidence supports the conclusion that claimant
Zupon did not establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,
medical causation between his 1975 industrial accident and his
now claimed total permanent disability.
Petitioner, like the claimant in Zupon. received partial
impairment ratings attributable to the 1976 industrial accident
years before a claim for permanent total disability was filed."
Shortly after the industrial accident and thereafter, Petitioner,
like claimant Zupon, had a significant impairment unrelated to
the industrial accident.

In 1992, the medical panel for the

Commission found that 40% of Petitioner's disability was related
to his pulmonary (respiratory) condition.

Petitioner, like the

claimant in Zupon, did receive Social Security benefits prior to
his filing of an application for permanent total disability.

The

claimant in Zupon waited sixteen years to file his application
for permanent total disability.

Petitioner waited fifteen years

to file his claim for permanent total disability.
In Large v. Industrial Commission of Utah,

10

° this Court

held that:
Under the medical cause test, the claimant
must prove the disability is medically the
result of an exertion or an injury that
occurred during a work related activity. The
standard of proof for causation is by a
preponderance of the evidence.

"Facts HH17,
100
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This Court, in Large. found that the industrial injury, for
which the claimant received a 5% permanent partial impairment
rating, was not the medical cause of claimant's permanent total
disability and that the claimant's age, obesity, lack of
transferable skills and prior back surgery resulted in his
disability.
This Court concluded in Large that there was an inadequate
causal link between the permanent total disability and the
industrial inj ury.
Accordingly, Petitioner's argument, based on the "odd lot
doctrine," is not applicable and need not be addressed because
the Commission found that Petitioner's industrial injury did not
medically cause his permanent total disability.
POINT III
THE COMMISSION IS THE ULTIMATE FACT FINDER.
The Petitioner criticizes the Commission for reversing the
ALJ.

Petitioner argues that the ALJ prepared extensive Findings

of Fact and Conclusions while the Commission incorporated the
ALJ's Findings of Fact and articulated its reasons in a less
exhaustive manner.
In Commercial Carriers and Old Republic Insurance v.
Industrial Commission of Utah,101 this Court reviewed a decision
by the Commission to reverse the ALJ.

101

It was argued in

Commercial Carriers v. Industrial Commission, 255 Utah
Adv. Rep. 57 (Utah App.).
(A copy of Commercial Carriers v.
Industrial Commission. supra is attached as Appendix "C".
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Commercial Carriers that the Commission could not reverse the
ALJ's Findings of Fact without stating specifically and in detail
the reasons for doing so.
This Court held in Commercial Carriers that, while it is the
ALJ who initially hears the evidence, the Commission is the
ultimate fact finder.102

The decisions of the Commission, not the

ALJ, are deemed conclusive.
This Court further stated that the Commission's findings are
of sufficient detail if this Court can discern the Commission's
logical process, i.e. subsidiary fact findings logically to lead
to ultimate fact findings.

This Court concluded that:

It is the province of the Board, not the
appellate courts, to resolve conflicting
evidence and where inconsistent inferences
can be drawn from the same evidence, it is
for the Board to draw the inferences.103
Although the Commission incorporated the Findings of Fact of
the ALJ, it was obligated to apply the appropriate burden on the
Petitioner to establish a causal relationship between the 1976
industrial accident and permanent total disability particularly
since the evidence shows that there is no medical causation.

The

Commission was obligated to place the burden on Petitioner to
show why he could no longer perform his duties with the City in
1977.
The Commission is the ultimate fact finder.
102

The Commission

Id. citing Chase v. Industrial Commission, 872 P.2d 475,
479 (Utah App. 1994).
103

I£. at 59.
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gave specific reasons for its decision which are supported by the
Findings of Fact.
ALJ's decision.

The Commission is not required to accept the

On the contrary, if the ALJ has not applied the

facts properly, the Commission must correct the error.
CONCLUSION
The Commission, as the ultimate fact finder, properly found,
based upon the Findings of Fact, that Petitioner failed to show,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the industrial accident
on May 21, 1976 was the medical cause of Petitioner's permanent
and total disability.

There is substantial evidence to support

the Commission's decision.

The "odd lot doctrine", therefore,

does not apply to this case.
DATED this J_

day of /[/fafCL^

1995.

FRANK M. NAKAMUI
Assistant City Attorney
Attorney for Respondents
Salt Lake City Corporation
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FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

HEARING:

Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 3 00 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on April
14, 1992 at 1:00 o'clock p.m.
Said hearing was
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and was represented by
Virginius Dabney, Attorney.
The defendant, Salt Lake City Corporation (SelfInsured), was represented by Ray Montgomery,
Attorney.
The Employers Reinsurance Fund was represented by
Erie Boorman, Attorney/Administrator.

This case involves a claim for permanent total disability
benefits related to a May 21, 1976 industrial accident resulting in
injuries to the applicant7s right ankle and his left knee. At the
time of the hearing, the self-insured employer and the Employers
Reinsurance Fund argued that the applicant was not entitled to
permanent total disability benefits because the applicant's
disabling condition was his non-industrial pulmonary obstruction
and not the orthopedic problems that resulted from the industrial
accident. The Employers Reinsurance Fund pointed out that the
applicant's orthopedic problems have remained static in the 16
years since the industrial accident (or may have even improved),
while the pulmonary problems have become more symptomatic. The
applicant responded that he never returned to work after his trial
re-employment in 1977 and that he was awarded Social Security
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Disability with the onset date being the same date as the
industrial accident date. The applicant also pointed out that he
was 63 years old, had only a 9th grade education and had no
transferable skills. He testified that he has not worked since
1977 because his right ankle and left knee, in combination, prevent
him from doing the physical work that he has done for a living all
his life.
Just prior to the hearing, the defendant/ self--insured
employer filed a hearing memorandum in which the employer argued
the addtional defense that the applicant was barred from pursuing
a permanent total disability claim for having failed to file an
application for hearing with the Industrial Commission within 3
years of the date of the last payment of compensation (last payment
asserted by the employer to have been in January of 1983 with the
application for hearing on the permanent total disability claim
being filed in November of 1990). Counsel for the employer cited
U.C.A. 35-1-99 for this statute of limitations.
At hearing,
counsel was provided with the citations for Mecham v. Industrial
Commission, 692 P.2d 783 (Utah 1984) and Buxton v. Industrial
Commission, 587 P.2d 121 (Utah 1978) as precedent for the
proposition that there is no separate statute of limitations for
permanent total disability claims once the initial filing
requirements are met. However, counsel reasserted the U.C.A. 35-199 3-year statute of limitations defense post-hearing in a letter
to the ALJ dated April 24, 1992, indicating that he had reviewed
the cited cases and found they were distinguishable from the
instant case. In the same letter, counsel cites the 1990 amendment
to U.C.A. 35-1-98, which does specify a 6-year statute of
limitations for permanent total disability claims.
Because the applicant has a history of a number of injuries
and/or medical problems, after the hearing, the matter was referred
to a medical panel to have the applicant's impairments rated and
apportioned as to those existing prior to the industrial accident,
those caused by the industrial accident and those developing
subsequent to the industrial accident. The medical panel report
was received on November 12, 1992 and was distributed to the
parties on November 13, 1992, with 15 days allowed for objections.
On November 30, 1992, counsel for the applicant submitted a letter
to the ALJ requesting that the panel clarify when the applicant's
pulmonary impairment occurred. The ALJ sent a letter to the panel
chairman on December 1, 1992 requesting clarification and the
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chairman responded in a letter received at the Commission on
January 4, 1993. This clarification report was distributed to the
parties on January 6, 1993, with an additional 15 days allowed for
objections.
On January 14, 1993, counsel for the applicant wrote the ALJ
requesting a tentative finding of permanent total disability and
requesting that the attorneys for the self-insured employer and the
Employers Reinsurance Fund waive the statutorily mandated_referral
to the Utah State Office of Education Division of Rehabilitation.
Counsel renewed this request in another letter received at the
Commission on January 25, 1993. On February 1, 1993, the ALJ
received a letter from counsel for the employer indicating that no
waiver was being made, because the employer felt that the
industrial injury did not cause the applicant to be permanently
totally disabled (primarily because the majority of the applicant7s
impairment was related to the non-industrial pulmonary condition).
On February 22, 1993, the ALJ also received a letter from the
Employers Reinsurance Fund which indicates that the Fund agreed
with the employer that the permanent total disability was not
caused by the industrial injury.
Counsel for the applicant
responded to the letters of the employer and the Employers
Reinsurance Fund in a letter dated February 23, 1993, indicating
that even before the development of the pulmonary condition, the
Social Security Administration had found the applicant disabled as
of the date of the industrial accident.
On March 2, 1993, the ALJ wrote counsel for the employer and
the Employers Reinsurance Fund requesting that they waive the
statutory referral to the Division of Rehabilitation as logically
it did not seem possible that the Division would attempt to offer
rehabilitation to the applicant considering his age and long time
unemployed status. The ALJ noted that she was not requesting a
waiver of any of the defenses either party had asserted up to that
point, merely just a waiver of the rehabilitation referral. On
March 3, 1993 counsel for the Employers Reinsurance Fund provided
the ALJ with a stipulation to waive the referral and on March 8,
1993 counsel for the employer provided the ALJ with a stipulation
to waive the referral.
On March 11, 1993, counsel for the
applicant filed another letter reiterating that the pulmonary
problems were
never
considered
by
the
Social
Security
Administration in awarding the applicant disability benefits and
indicating that the applicant was awarded the benefits based on
orthopedic problems that included the right ankle and left knee
problems that were caused by the 1976 industrial injury at issue.

ORDER
RE: GERALD HANSEN
PAGE 4

The matter was considered ready for a final order as of March 8,
1993 when the ALJ received the final stipulation to waive the
rehabilitation referral from the employer.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
The applicant is a male who was 47 years old on the date of
injury, May 21, 1976, and who had a wife and one minor child as-of
that date. In school, the applicant completed the 9th grade and
did attend the 10th grade for a part of a year. The applicant
testified that he can read, but stated that his writing was
somewhat illegible. The first employment that he can recall was
when he drove a pick-up truck for United Supply Delivery. Right
after that, the applicant started to work as a glazier and did this
for the rest of his employment life. The applicant was employed
with Salt Lake City Corporation on the date of injury, having been
hired by Salt Lake City on March 2, 1971. The applicant worked as
a maintenance man and glazier at the Salt Lake City Airport. The
applicant plowed runways in the winter using heavy equipment and
mowed lawns during the spring and summer. He operated other heavy
equipment as well, including front end loaders, backhoes and
graders. The applicant also was an experienced glazier and had
worked as a glazier for Granite School District from May 19 65
through February 1971. Part of the applicant's responsibilities at
the Salt Lake City Airport was installing glass. The applicant was
earning $950.00 per month as of the date of injury, or
approximately $219.40 per week. On May 21, 1976, the applicant was
unloading a crate of glass when the crate tipped over and the glass
fell on the applicant, primarily effecting his right lower
extremity.
The applicant had surgery on his right ankle on May 21, 1976
and later had left knee surgery on September 8, 1976, which was
determined to be related to the industrial accident as well.
Almost immediately after the surgery on the left knee, the
applicant was hospitalized again for a pulmonary embolus.
Approximately mid-January 1977, the applicant returned to work for
Salt Lake City Corporation, apparently doing his normal work
duties. The applicant recalls returning to work in December of
1976, but the majority of the documentary evidence reflects a
return to work on approximately January 13, 1977. On approximately
February 4, 1977, the applicant was at work carrying a bundle of
chain link fencing when his left knee and right foot gave way,
causing him to fall to the ground. It is not clear whether or not
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the applicant actually caused any aggravation to his left knee or
right foot when this occurred, but he did not return to work after
that injury. The applicant stated that the combination of problems
with his left knee and right ankle caused him to be unable to walk
and stand for any time, caused inability to lift greater than 25
pounds and prevented him from bending and stooping. He testified
that Salt Lake City told him that he was terminated because he was
unable to perform the duties that were required of him at the Salt
Lake City Airport. However, Salt Lake City presented a copy of a
May 10, 1977 letter sent to the applicant indicating that he was to
go to personnel to see what other jobs might be available to him.
At hearing, it was determined that the letter was not sent to the
applicant's proper home address and the applicant does not recall
receiving the letter.
On May 24, 1977, Dr. E. Heyes, the orthopedic surgeon that
performed both the ankle and knee surgery following the industrial
accident, wrote a letter to Salt Lake City Corporation indicating
that the applicant could return to light duty work operating a
motor vehicle as of April 25, 1977.
However, the applicant
testified that he was unable to operate a clutch vehicle due to his
left knee and therefore was only able to drive a vehicle with an
automatic transmission. The applicant testified at hearing that he
could not really remember the events that transpired in mid-1977
with respect to his failed return to work. He recalls only that he
was unable to perform the work that he had performed all his life
(presumably glass installation) because of the left knee and right
ankle injuries and he recalls that there was no light duty
available to him at the airport.
On June 13, 1977, the applicant applied for social security
disability and on June 17, 1977, the applicant filed an application
for hearing with the Industrial Commission because he felt that the
impairment ratings he had been given were inusfficient (Dr. Heyes
had rated the ankle at 15% and the left knee at 5%, but his ratings
were non-specific and thus it is unclear if he was rating the lower
extremity or the whole person). From June of 1977 through May of
1978, the applicant was involved in litigating both his claim for
social security disability benefits and his claim for additional
workers compensation impairment benefits. During this time, the
applicant got no treatment for either his left knee or his right
ankle. However, he did begin to see Dr. W. Hebertson during this
period, in October of 1977, for back pain.
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The Industrial Commission litigation:
A hearing was held on September 19, 1977. The
matter was referred to a medical panel for
additional input with respect to what impairments
resulted due to the industrial accident.
The
medical panel report was issued on March 21, 1978
and rated the right foot at 12% whole person and
the left knee at 5% whole person, for- a total
industrial impairment of 16% whole person.
The
panel concluded that the back problems and right
elbow problems were not related to the May 21, 1976
industrial accident. The panel report indicates
that the panel relied on office notes of Dr. E.
Heyes dated prior to the industrial accident for
their conclusion that the right elbow problems preexisted the industrial accident.
Those office
notes are not included in the medical record
exhibit (Exhibit A-l) presently being utilized for
the instant litigation. On May 10, 1978, Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order were entered
awarding the applicant temporary total compensation
(TTC) from May 22, 1976 though January 12, 1977 and
from February 4, 1977 through April 25, 1977 and
awarding permanent impairment benefits based on the
16% whole person rated by the panel.
The Social Security Litigation:
Responding to the applicant's June 13, 1977
application
for
disability
benefits, Social
Security denied the application on September 29,
1977, stating that the applicant was capable of
doing light work.
On October 31, 1977, the
applicant filed a request for reconsideration,
indicating that his movement was so resticted that
he could not work. He noted that the doctor had
told him that he didn't want the applicant even
looking for work and didn't want the applicant
going to school until he was recovered.
The
applicant asserted that he could only walk with a
cane and could do no lifting.
On December 13,
1977, Social Security again denied benefits,
indicating that the applicant could still do

ORDER
RE: GERALD HANSEN
PAGE 7

sedentary work and that his experience as a glazier
resulted in him having transferable skills. On
January 27, 1978, the applicant filed a request for
hearing.
On May 31, 1978, the applicant was
awarded disability benefits based primarily on the
right ankle and secondarily on the low back, with
the left knee mentioned as an additional problem.
Apparently, the Social Security ALJ relied a great
deal on the testimony of a vocational expert who
found that the applicant did not have the-residual
functional capacity to perform substantial gainful
employment. The benefits awarded were to begin as
of May 21, 1976.

From August of 1978 through August of 1979, the applicant
saw Dr. Hebertson almost exclusively. Dr. Hebertson's office notes
are brief and illegible and his periodic letters to Salt Lake City
Corporation are very brief.
Dr. Hebertson just lists the
applicant's complaints in his letters and office notes and those
include: right ankle pain, back pain, left knee pain, right elbow
pain, and neck pain. Apparently, the only treatment provided by
Dr. Hebertson was presciption medication. This medication included
percodan or percocet (apparently at one point tylox was
substituted), either dalmane, Seconal, nebutal or halcion, Valium,
and varying combinations of rela, indocin or fiorinal.
The
frequency and amount of percodan or percocet was gradually
increased during 1979 and 1980. By 1981, the amount prescribed was
a regular and consistent 100 per month. This continued along with
the other medications through 1988, when the the amount of
percodan/percocet was reduced to 60 per month. The prescription
refill notes continue in Dr. Hebertson's records through 1990.
In August of 1979, the applicant began alternating his
visits with Dr. Hebertson with visits to Dr. Jonathon Home. The
applicant saw Dr. H o m e for his left knee and right ankle and per
numerous indications in Dr. Home's notes, the applicant told Dr.
H o m e that he could not take medication for his knee and ankle due
to an ulcer problem. Dr. H o m e was thus under the impression that
some other form of treatment was necessary. Dr. H o m e performed a
second knee surgery on November 12, 1979 and a second ankle surgery
on March 10, 1980. The applicant saw Dr. H o m e regularly, in
between visits to Dr. Hebertson, through September of 1980. In
September of 1980, Dr. H o m e rated the applicant's impairment to
the left knee and right ankle at 32% whole person (twice the amount
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rated by the previous medical panel) and this prompted the
applicant to file a second application for hearing with the
Industrial Commission. The matter was again referred to a medical
panel which rated the applicants impairment at a total of 14%
whole person (actually less than the 16% rated by the original
panel) . Additional impairment benefits were denied in the final
order (issued on December 31, 1982) but additional temporary total
compensation was awarded, apparently related to the two additional
surgeries performed by Dr. H o m e ,
From October 1980 through March of 1982, the applicant
alternated between seeing Dr. Hebertson for his presciptions and
going to the VA Hospital for pulmonary related problems.
In
October of 1982, the applicants Social Security disabilty award
came up for review and the applicant represented to Social Security
at that time that he needed 2 canes to walk, that he didn't drive,
that he needed assistance bathing and that he was unable to do
anything physical. In connection with the review, Dr. H o m e issued
a report in November of 1982 indicating that the applicant would
need a right ankle arthrodesis within the next year or two because
of increased arthritis in the foot joints. Dr. H o m e noted that
the applicant's foot was likely to get worse and that the applicant
could only walk one block before he experienced severe pain in the
foot.
Dr. G. Zeluff did an examination and analysis of the
applicant's condition in December of 1982, apparently at the
request of Social Security. His report sates that he felt the
applicant's complaints were out of proportion to his examination
findings.
He noted that there was only minimal degenerative
changes in the back, right ankle and left knee. Dr. Hebertson also
did a report for Social Security in December of 1982 and just lists
the applicant's complaints as: right chest soreness, low back pain,
right foot pain, pain and swelling in the left knee, intrascapular
pain, arthritic finger pain and headaches. Dr. Hebertson notes
that he had done no range of motion testing, had taken no X-rays
and had done no inquiry with respect to the applicant's activity
restrictions.
On January 11, 1983, the applicant's Social Security
benefits were discontinued. The decision to discontinue benefits
notes that the applicant was able to do substantial gainful
activity as of January of 1983, It was noted that the applicant's
breathing capacity was "O.K.11 and that his loss of range of motion
in the ankle, head and back was only moderate, with no loss of
range of motion in the left knee. The arthritis in the left knee
and right ankle was determined to be moderate and it was decided
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that the applicant could use his hands and arms without
restricition.
It was noted that the applicant could walk
adequately and that he could perform light work.
Transferable
skills were found to exist. On March 7, 1983, the applicant filed
a request for reconsideration and on October 26, 1983, benefits
were reinstated.
The reinstatement decision indicates that a
combination of problems caused the applicant to be disabled.
Specifically noted was the applicant's arthritis, secondary to his
orthopedic problems. It was determined that the arthritis caused
incapacitating pain. The applicant's residual functional capacity
was determined to be at the sedentary level, with the applicant
having no transferable skills. The applicant's advanced age, and
his minimal education were also noted.
Benefits were awarded
continuous from May 21, 1976.
From March of 1983 through May of 1985, the applicant saw
Dr. Hebertson primarily for his prescriptions, with only an
occasional visit to Dr. H o m e . In August of 1983, a Dr. R. Daynes
wrote the applicant after examining him and stated that it was
advisable for the applicant to reduce his daily percodan intake as
well as his alcohol intake.
Beginning in June of 1985, the
applicant saw only Dr. Hebertson through August of 1987. The
applicant continued to see Dr. Hebertson only through August of
1990, except that he had continuing visits to the VA Hospital for
his pulmonary problems.
III.

Specific Problems;

In order to make it easier for the medical panel to assess
the impairments, the ALJ presented the panel with the following
list of specific problems noted in the medical records, with a
breakdown based on what problems surfaced prior to the industrial
accident and which became apparent only after the industrial
accident.
A.

RIGHT ANKLE:
1. Prior to May 21, 1976 - no mention made in medical

records
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2. After May 21, 1976 5-21-76

SURGERY - by Dr. E. Heyes at St. Mark's Hospital
- Procedure: repair of laceration of posterior
deltoid ligament

2-4-77

slip and fall when applicant attempted return to
work - treated by Dr. Heyes

9-1-77

continuing problems described by Dr. D. Loken as
pain in the foot and ankle except if the
applicant walked on the lateral border of the
foot, with numbness in the heel, and swelling of
the ankle - rated at 10% (non-specific with
respect to lower extremity or whole man)

3-21-78

Industrial Commission medical panel rates the
ankle at 12% whole person

9-19-79

Dr. J. H o m e attempts treating ankle with a short
leg walking cast - this apparently is helpful
with the applicant supposedly telling Dr. H o m e
that he was able to run up or down stairs by
October of 1979

12-19-79 Dr. J. H o m e tries using a leather brace to treat
the ankle and indicates that the applicant may
someday need a fusion - the ankle brace does not
improve the applicant's symptoms
2-11-80

Dr. J. H o m e does an X-ray of the ankle and notes
increased bone chips

3-10-80

SURGERY - by Dr. J. H o m e at Cottonwood Hospital
- Procedure: arthrotomy and excision of bone
spurs of fibula and talus - in follow-up, by 4-80
Dr. H o m e notes that the applicant is able to
walk with a flat foot, but aching still is
present

6-7-80

CT scan done at Western Neurological Associates
is read to show the only abnormality to be soft
tissue calcifications just below the lateral
malleous
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6-23-80

Dr. J. H o m e notes that the ankle still swells
and has pain and he rates the ankle at 30% of the
lower extremity

6-28-82

Dr. J. H o m e lists the diagnosis for the ankle as
subtalar joint arthritis and mild recurrent spurs
in the fibula/talar joint - he tries treating the
arthritis with feldene

11-17-82 Industrial Commission medical panel rates - the
ankle at 19% of the lower extremity (8% whole
person) and finds that a fusion may be necessary
in the distant future
11-29-82 Dr. J. H o m e tells Social Security that the
applicant will need an arthrodesis of the ankle
in the next year or two due to increased
arthritis in the foot joints
B. LEFT ANKLE
1. Prior to May 21, 1976 - no mention made in medical
records
2. After May 21, 1976 11-24-84 the applicant is seen at Cottonwood Hospital for
a left ankle sprain - Dr. H o m e follows-up with
at short leg cast and the injury is apparently
resolved by December of 1984 when the cast is
removed
C. LEFT KNEE
1. Prior to May 21, 1976 - no mention made in medical
records
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2. After May 21, 1976 9-8-76

SURGERY by Dr. E. Heyes at St. Mark's Hospital Procedure: arthrostomy followed by arthrotomy and
medical menisectomy

9-1-77

Dr. D. Loken describes continuing problems as
numbness in the lateral aspect, with the knee
giving out when weight is placed on it - it is
noted that the applicant needs to hold on to
something when he is going upstairs - Dr. Loken
rates the knee at 5% of the lower extremity

3-21-78

Industrial Commission medical panel rates the
knee at 5% whole person

11-12-79 SURGERY by Dr. J. H o m e at Cottonwood Hospital Procedure: 1) arthroscopy, 2) debridement of
chondromalacia
(patella), 3) debridement of
chondromalacia
(medial femoral condyle) 4)
lateral fasciotomy - Post-operative diagnosis:
severe chondromalacia of patella medial femoral
condyle left knee, scarred superpatellar synovial
band left knee
6-23-80

Dr. J. H o m e notes that the knee still swells and
is painful -he rates the knee at 2 0% of the lower
extremity

11-17-82 Industrial Commission medical panel rates the
left knee at 14% of the lower extremity or 6%
whole person - the panel finds that a joint
replacement may be necessary in the distant
future
D. BACK
1. Prior to May 21, 1976 1966

per the applicant's testimony, he was involved in
a car accident in 1966 which resulted in the need
for 5 days of traction in the hospital
(Cottonwood Hospita) - medical records for this
incident are not included in the current medical
record exhibit
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4-7-72

Dr. J. H o m e notes that the applicant fell in a
grease pit and landed on his left hip - this
caused the applicant to twist his low back and
bruise the left iliac crest - diagnosed as a
sprain/strain of the lumbosacral spine, doubted
herniated nucleous pulpous - treated with
percodan, robaxin and a lumbosacral corset apparently resolved after several months of
seeing Dr. H o m e - unclear if this accident is
the same one mentioned by the applicant -at
hearing in which he fell backwards and hit his
low back (about 2 inches above the tailbone) on a
concrete edge

2. After May 21, 1976 4-1-77

Dr. D. Loken notes that the back pain began about
February or March of 1977 (around the time that
the applicant fell with the chain link fence upon
attempting to return to work after the industrial
accident of 5-21-76) - Dr. Loken notes no
neurological findings and no X-ray findings

9-27-77

Dr. E. Heyes writes Social Security and indicates
that the applicant felt that the back pain he was
having was due to his limping - D. Heyes notes
that this is possible

10-17-77 Dr. Hebertson notes that the applicant may have
twisted his back when he was carrying the chain
link fence at work around February 4, 1977
1-78 through 5-78
Dr.
Hebertson
makes
repeated
notations
that the applicant needs to have a myelogram apparently this is never done
1-17-83

Dr. H o m e notes that the applicant has had back
pain on and off since the 1966 car accident - he
notes no neurological findings and normal
reflexes, range of motion, sensation and power Dr. Home's diagnosis is: 1) mild degenerative
changes, narrowing at L5-S1, 2) mild herniation
or possible herniation at L5-S1 and 3) chronic
sprain/strain of lumbosacral spine
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5-1-85

*"^ applicant sees Dr. H o m e regarding back pain

E. RIGHT ELBOW:
1. Prior to May 21, 1976:
3-21-78

the medical panel report of this date indicates
that the panel had office notes of Dr. E. Heyes
varifying a right elbow condition treated by Dr.
Heyes prior to the industrial accident - these
office notes are not included in the present
medical record exhibit

2. After May 21, 1976:
6-8-77

SURGERY by Dr. E. Heyes at St. Mark's Hospital Procedure: exploration and partial division of
annular ligament

9-1-77

Dr. D. Loken finds that the right elbow has
minimal symptoms at this point

F. LEFT ELBOW:
1. Prior to May 21, 1976:
6-8-70

Dr. J* H o m e notes that the applicant had a left
elbow contusion while fishing

2. After May 21, 1976:
4-2-86

Dr. J. H o m e notes that the applicant fell on his
left elbow
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G. PULMONARY PROBLEMS:
1. Prior to May 21, 1976:
3-14-72

a chest X-ray at St. Mark's Hospital (apparently
taken while the applicant was an inpatient for an
ulcer) shows some findings

5-21-76

while the applicant is hospitalized at St. Mark's
Hospital for his right ankle industrial injury,
the records note that the applicant had pneumonia
in 1974 leaving right lower lobe scars - the
records also note that the applicant is being
followed by Dr. Abaunza for repeated shortness of
breath

2. After May 21, 1976:

9-13-76 through 9-21-76
the applicant is hospitalized at St. Mark's
Hospital for chest pain and a suspected pulmonary
embolus and is treated by Dr. K. Ritchie with
anti-coagulants
10-14-80 the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for a 6week cough - it is noted that the applicant is a
40-50 pack year smoker
10-22-80 through 11-13-80 the applicant is hospitalized at
the VA Hospital for an abnormal mass seen on a
chest X-ray - the applicant undergoes a number of
procedures including: 1) a bronchoscopy on 10-2480, 2) a rigid brondchoscopy and right middle and
right lower lobectomy on 10-31-80 - the discharge
diagnosis is: endobrachial hamartoma, right lower
lobe
1-7-81

the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for an
upper respiratory tract infection
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2-24-81

the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for
post-surgical thoracic pain which is treated with
an intercostal block injection and elavil

3-22-81

the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for
chest wall pain

4-25-81

the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for
pleural effusion

5-81

the applicant is seen at the University Hospital
Pain Clinic for difficulty managing the postsurgical chest pain

5-19-81

the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for
acute bronchitis

3-7-92

the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for
chest wall pain

11-17-82 the Industrial Commission medical panel finds
that the applicant's respiratory problems are due
to a tumor which may have been present as early
as the date of injury (5-21-76) but is unrelated
causally to the industrial accident
3-7-85

the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital as a
result of upper respiratory tract infections with
sharp chest pain in December of 1984 and January
of 1985

12-22-87, 12-29-87 and 1-9-88
the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and/or
chronic bronchitis
9-26-88

pulmonary fucntion tests are done at the VA
Hospital and it is determined that the applicant
has moderate obstruction

11-5-88

the applicnat is seen at the VA Hospital for
chest pain - an EKG is read as normal - followups occur on 11-22-88 and 11-28-88

1-24-89

the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for an
increase in his chronic shortness of breath
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3-7-89

pulmonary function tests are done at the VA
Hospital and it is again determined that the
applicant has moderate obstruction

3-29-89 through 4-5-89
the applicant is an in-patient at the VA Hospital
due to chronic obstructive pulmonary disease follow-up occurs on 5-30-89
6-10-89, 7-19-89, 7-21-89
the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital due to
acute exacerbations of his chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease
H, HEADACHES
1. Prior to May 21, 1976:
1947

the applicant is struck in the head by a hoist
cable while unloading a boat while he was in the
military - the applicant recalls that he had loss
of conciousness, possibly for more than one day,
and he develops periodic headaches thereafter

2. After May 21, 1976:
12-80

the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for
syncope, dizzy spells and nausea and an acoustic
neuroma is ruled out - extensive testing occurs

8-14-87

the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for
headaches which is noted to be related to a head
trauma in the service - it is noted that the
headaches have increased over the last few years
and that the headaches are associated with
photophobia

9-3-87

the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital in
follow-up on his headaches and elvavil is
prescribed
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I. PSYCHIATRIC
1. Prior to May 21, 1976:
1964

the applicant is voluntarily committed to a
hospital in California - the applicant testified
that he was there for 2 months and received
therapy and medication during his stay - per the
applicant's testimony, he was depressed and had
put his fist through a wall prior to his
admission without provocation

2. After May 21, 1976:
5-81 though 7-81
the applicant is taught relaxation
techniques at the VA Hospital to deal with his
post-surgical chest pain -the applicant is also
given amitriptylline

Briefly mentioned in the medical records or testimony were
several things that developed prior to May 21, 1976. The applicant
was hospitalized (at St. Mark's Hospital) in March of 1972 for an
ulcer problem and Dr. W. Hebertson did a consult during this
hospital stay for hand/arm numbness that the applicant was
experiencing. The applicant also had some neck problems associated
with the back injury that he had in the 1966 car accident. Dr.
Hebertson lists neck complaints occasionally in his list of
symptoms that he was treating with "drug therapy." The applicant
also had some vision impairment prior to the industrial accident
which the applicant contends is verified by the 4-6-76 report of
Dr. Quinn that is attached to the top of the medical record
exhibit. In addition, the applicant states that he feels that his
hearing got gradually worse after he got out of the service and
thus he feels that he had some hearing loss at the time of the
industrial accident, but there are no medical records regarding his
hearing dated prior to the industrial accident.
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The medical panel consisted of Dr. M. Thomas, a neurologist,
Dr. W. Hess, an orthopedist and Dr. R. Burgoyne, a psychiatrist.
The panel concluded that the applicant's whole person impairment
was as follows: 12% for the right ankle (all attributable to the 521-76 accident), 5% for the left knee (all attributable to the 521-76 accident) , 2% for the left ankle (all attributable to
problems arising AFTER the industrial accident), 10% for the low
back (2.5% attrtibutable to problems existing BEFORE the industrial
accident and 7.5% attributable to problems arising AFTER the
industrial accident) and 1% for the applicant's macular
degeneration (all attributable to problems arising AFTER the
industrial accident). The panel found that the applicant had 0%
permanent impairment related to the following problems noted in the
medical records: right elbow status post division of annular
ligament, somatoform pain disorder and thinking disorder (in
remission), and headahces. Per the clarification report submitted
by the panel at the ALJ's request on January 4, 1993, the
applicant's 40% whole person impairment related to the pulmonary
condition (status post-partial pneumonectomy for hamartoma with
COPD, moderate impairment, stable) was wholly attributable to
problems arising AFTER the industrial accident.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Preliminary Conclusions:
The ALJ adopts the findings of the medical panel with
respect to the applicant's impairment ratings and the indications
as to when the impairments arose.
There have been no real
objections to the panel findings and the panel ratings are not
seriously contradicted by any other medical evidence. Therefore,
the ALJ will use the panel ratings to assess the applicant's
relative physical impairments and their impact on his permanent
disability. The ALJ presumes that neither defendant (the employer
nor the Employers Reinsurance Fund) contests a finding that the
applicant is currently unable to return to any of his previous work
and that he is currently.not susceptible to rehabilitation.. The
ALJ bases this presumption on the fact that no evidence has been
presented with respect to the applicant's ability to work at this
time and on the fact that the defendants have waived a referral for
a determination regarding the applicant's susceptibility to
rehabilitation.
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Statute of Limitations:
The ALJ finds that the applicant is not barred from claiming
permanent total disability benefits due to the 3-year filing
requirement in U.C.A. 35-1-99, as it read on the date of the
applicant's industrial injury, or due to the 1990 amendment to
U.C.A. 35-1-98, as counsel for the employer has argued. The ALJ
finds that the 1990 amendment to U.C.A. 35-1-98 (specifying a 6year statute of limitations for permanent total disability claims)
is not applicable, because that amendment was enacted 14 years
after the applicant's date of injury. The employer has provided no
explanation regarding why this amended version of U.C.A. 35-1-98
should apply to this case, and thus the ALJ will simply follow the
well established principal that the law as of the date of injury is
the correct law to apply. Although the ALJ finds that the U.C.A.
35-1-99 provision cited by counsel for the employer was the law at
the time of the applicant's injury, the ALJ finds that case law
narrowly limits the application of that 3-year filing requirement
so that it does not bar the applicant's claim in this case.
The Mecham case cited at the beginning of this order is
factually almost identical to this case.
In that case, the
applicant had a 19 61 injury which was litigated at the Industrial
Commission from 1964 through 1966. Pursuant to that litigation,
the applicant was awarded benefits for a permanent partial
impairment only. The last payment of compensation was made in
December of 1964. It was not until December of 1982, that the
applicant formally filed a claim for permanent total disability
benefits with the Commission. The claim was dismissed by the ALJ
because the claim was filed more than 3 years after the last
payment of compensation. The Supreme Court reversed this ruling,
noting that the applicant had met the 3-year filing requirement,
because reports were filed just after the date of injury by the
employer and the applicant's physicians. The Court found that the
filing of these reports created jurisdiction for the Commission and
that to determine if there was any further time limits for filing,
one had to consult the particular statute dealing with the kind of
benefits being claimed (in the case of permanent total disability
benefits, the particular statute is U.C.A. 35-1-67) . The Court
found that U.C.A. 35-1-67 contained no separate time limit for
filing a permanent total disability claim and thus the 18 year time
lapse between the last payment of compensation and the 1982 filing
with the Commission did not act as a bar to the applicant's
permanent total disability claim.
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The ALJ does not understand why counsel for the employer
feels that the Mecham case is not on point. One need only change
the dates and the facts are almost identical. Absent some better
explanation from counsel as to why he feels the Mecham case is
inapplicable, the ALJ must conclude that the Mecham case is the
ruling precedent on the applicability of the U.C.A. 35-1-99 3-year
statute of limitations to the instant case. Based on the Court's
ruling in Mecham, the applicant in the instant case met the 3-year
filing requirement back in 1976 when reports were filed with the
Commission and thus he does not need to again meet-the requirement
after the last payment of compensation in order to file a permanent
total disability claim. Based on this ruling, the ALJ will proceed
to decide the merits of the applicant's claim for permanent total
disability benefits.

The Cause of the Permanent Total Disability;
The main issue in this case is whether the applicant's
inability to work has been caused by the 1976 industrial injury.
Counsel for the employer has cited the cases Large v. Industrial
Commission, 758 P. 2d 954 (Utah App. 1988) and Hodges v. Western
Piling & Sheeting Co. , 717 P. 2d 713 (Utah 1986) for the proposition
that an award of permanent total disability benefits can only be
made where it is the industrial injury that causes the disability
(as opposed to a situation where an industrial injury occurs, but
some other factor or condition causes the disability). The ALJ
agrees that these two cases stand for the proposition that there
must be some causal link between the industrial injury and the
inability to work.
Both the employer and the Employers Reinsurance Fund have
argued that, currently, the applicant's most disabling condition is
his respiratory condition. Certainly, the 40% whole person rating
that the panel has assessed for that condition makes it clear that
the respiratory impairment is the most significant impairment that
the applicant has currently. However, in analyzing what is the
cause of the permanent total disability, the proper time focus is
not necessarily on the applicant's impairment status at the date of
hearing, but rather his impairment status at the date that he
discontinued working. Also, physical impairment alone is not the
only relevant criteria for determining what is causing an
individual to be unable to work.
In deterining whether an
industrial injury causes permanent total disability, the ALJ finds
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that it is appropriate to look at the time at which the applicant
discontinued working and then to determine what factor or factors
(including, but not limited to physical impairment) caused the
applicant to discontinue his/her working status.
Unfortunately, the absence of a separate statute of
limitations for permanent total disability claims allows for
significant time delays between the discontinuance of work and the
filing of a permanent total disability claim. These time delays in
turn cause the employer or carrier to be unable to perform any
meaningful discovery with respect to the cause of the
discontinuance of work. This certainly has occurred in this case.
Because the applicant discontinued working in 1977 and did not file
a permanent total disability claim until late 1991, information
regarding what was happening in 1977 for the applicant is very
sparse.
In addition, in this particular case, this lack of
information is compounded by the fact that the applicant recalls
very little about why he discontinued working and what efforts he
made, or could have made, to continue working in 1977. Finally,
clearly the statute anticipates that there will be some efforts at
rehabilitation once an injured employee determines he is unable to
return to his prior employment because of a job injury. However,
at this point, the defendants and the Division of Rehabilitation
cannot even attempt to offer rehabilitation, because the applicant
has developed a post-injury significant respiratory condition,
because he is now nearly retirement age, and because he has not
worked for the past 16 years.
Based on the foregoing concerns, the ALJ does not feel that
she has very accurate information on which to make a determination
as to what caused the applicant to discontinue working in 1977.
Nevertheless, the ALJ must look at what information there is and
make this determination. The applicant testified that his right
ankle and left knee injuries on May 21, 1976 prevented him from
doing the fairly heavy work that a glazier is required to perform.
Therefore, when he was unable to return as a glazier for Salt Lake
City Corporation in February 1977, and because he believed he could
no longer perform this occupation, the applicant proceeded to apply
for Social Security Disability benefits at that time. The ALJ
feels that it is logical that the knee and ankle impairments
prevented the heavy lifting, prolonged standing and stooping
required in glass installation work. However, there is certainly
some indication in the medical records that the applicant might
have been able to perform some other kind of work, nothwithstanding
the knee and ankle impairments, in 1977. Dr. Heyes suggested that
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the applicant could be a driver and the applicant's initial
applications for Social Security Disability benefits were denied
because it was determined that he could still do light work.
Whereas rehabilitation currently is certainly untenable, in 1977
the applicant might have been able to return to some kind of work
had he sought or been offered some minimal new training.
Although logically it appears that return to work was not
completely foreclosed as of 1977, it would be speculative to -find
that the applicant was susceptible-to rehabilitation at that time.
No concrete evidence as been presented to support this conclusion.
Of course, as noted above, the long wait to file for permanent
total disability benefits is the primary cause of the lack of
concrete evidence on this point.
However, regardless of the
reason, there simply is insufficient evidence to show the applicant
was susceptible to rehabilitation in 1977. In 1978, after hearing
and testimony from a vocational expert, it was finally determined
that the applicant was disabled and entitled to Social Security
Disability benefits. It is interesting that the applicant was
initially denied continued disability benefits in 1983 when the
Social
Security Administration reassessed the
applicant's
disability status. Once again, it was asserted that by the Social
Security Administration that the applicant was capable of light
work, but in the final analysis, the applicant again was determined
disabled and his benefits were reinstated so as to be continuous
from the date of the industrial injury on. Based on the minimal
evidence available (primarily the Social Security Disability
records), the ALJ would have to say that the preponderance of the
evidence shows that the applicant has been disabled since the date
of his industrial injury, May 21, 1976, to the present.
The only remaining question is whether the past 16 years of
disability have been caused by the May 21, 197 6 industrial
accident. Once again, per the most relevant evidence available,
the Social Security Disability records reflect that the disability
benefits paid during this period were based on the applicant's
orthopedic problems, including the right ankle and left knee
impairment (solely attrtibutable to the industrial injury per the
medical panel) as well as the low back (wholly non-industrial per
the panel). There is no way of knowing whether the non-industrial
back impairment alone would have been a sufficient basis for
awarding the Social Security benefits.
Although it is not
completely clear why the ankle and knee problems are always listed
first on the determination synopsis sheets, it may be that these
were found to be the more significant problems. The panel did rate
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the left knee and right ankle combined somewhat higher than the
back.
In addition, there is very little mention of the back
problems in the medical records and very little treatment for the
back during the past 16 years. More attention has been paid to the
left knee and right ankle, per the medical records. Therefore,
based on the scant information available, the ALJ finds that the
primary cause of the applicant's disability during the past 16
years has been the left knee and right ankle impairments sustained
in the May 21, 1976 industrial accident.
In conclusion, the ALJ finds that the applicant has been
disabled since the industrial injury on May 21, 197 6 and that the
primary cause of this disability has been the industrial injuries
to the left knee and right ankle that were sustained on May 21,
1976. As the defendants have waived any referral to the Division
of Rehabilitation, the ALJ finds it is appropriate to make a final
award of permanent total disability benefits associated with the
May 21, 1976 industrial accident.
Benefits Due:
Prior Industrial Commission orders were entered on May 10,
1978,. awarding the applicant $6,737.15 in temporary total
compensation and $5,158.23 in permanent impairment benefits, and on
December 31, 1982 awarding the applicant $1,785.24 in additional
temporary total compensation. The compensation rate used in both
of those orders was $148.77/week.
The ALJ presumes that the
amounts awarded in these orders, a total of $13,680.61, constitutes
the full payment that has been made by Salt Lake City Corporation
on the May 21, 1976 industrial accident.
Salt Lake City's
liability for permanent total disability amounts to 312 weeks at
the maximum rate for permanent total disability benefits in May
1976 ($131.75), or a total of $41,106.00.
Of that amount
$27,425.39 remains to be paid ($41,106.00 - $13,680.61).
That
amount is accrued and due and payable in a lump sum, plus interest
and less the attorney fees to be adressed below. The Employers
Reinsurance Fund's liability for continuing benefits begins at the
conclusion of the initial 312 weeks or on January 30, 1983 (using
a start date February 5, 1977, the day following the last date of
work) .
The Employers Reinsurance Fund is to pay benefits at
$131.75 per week, or at the minimum rate for permanent total
disability applicable if that is higher.
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Attorney fees are based on the benefits generated by the
attorney in the first 312 weeks per Commission rule R568-1-7, or
$27,425.39. Per the rule, the attorney fees are $3,000.00 (20% of
the first $15,000.00 generated) + $1,8631.81 (15% of the remainder
if it is less than $15,000.00, as it is in this case, $12,725.39 x
.15) or a total of $4,863.81.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant, Salt Lake City
Corporation (Self-Insured), pay the applicant, Gerald Hansen,
permanent total disability benefits, at the rate of $131.75 per
week, for 312 weeks, or a total of $41,106.00, for the permanent
total disability resulting from the May 21, 1976 industrial
accident. That amount is accrued and due and payable in a lump
sum, less the $13,680.61 paid to date, plus interest at 8% per
annum, per U.C.A. 35-1-78, and less the attorney fees to.be awarded
below.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant, Salt Lake City
Corporation (Self-Insured), pay all medical expenses incurred as
the result of the May 21, 1976 industrial accident; said expenses
to be paid in accordance with the medical and surgical fee schedule
of the Industrial Commission of Utah.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant, Salt Lake City
Corporation (Self-Insured), pay Virginius Dabney, attorney for the
applicant, the sum of $4,8 63.81, plus the percentage of interest
that is appropriate per R568-1-7, for services rendered in this
matter, the same to be deducted from the aforesaid award to the
applicant, and to be remitted directly to the office of Virginius
Dabney.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrator of the Employers
Reinsurance Fund shall prepare the necessary vouchers directing the
State Treasurer, as Custodian of the Employers Reinsurance Fund to
place the applicant, Gerald Hansen, on the Employers Reinsurance
Fund payroll as of Janaury 30, 1983, with payments to be made to
him at the rate of $131.75 per week, or at the minimum applicable
rate if that is higher. Said payments to the applicant should
continue for the remainder of his life or until further notice from
the Commission. Accrued payments are due and payable in a lump
sum, plus interest at 8% per annum, per U.C.A. 35-1-78.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and
subject to review or appeal.
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Barbara Elicerio
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Certified by the Industrial Commission
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, 1993, a copy of the
attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in the
case of Gerald Hansen, was mailed to the following persons at the
following addresses, postage paid:

Gerald Hansen
1885 West Bowling Avenue
SLC, UT 84119
Virginius Dabney
Attorney at Law
350 South 400 East
SLC, UT 84111
Ray Montgomery
Attorney at Law
Salt Lake City Corporation
451 South State STreet, #505
SLC, UT 84111
Erie V. Boorman
Administrator
Employers' Reinsurance Fund
160 East 3 00 South
SLC, UT 84114-6612
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
GERALD R. HANSEN,

*
Applicant,

*
*

vs.

*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION and
EMPLOYER'S REINSURANCE FUND,

*
*

Case No. 90-1056

*

Defendants.

*
*

Mr. Hansen alleges that on May 21, 1976, he became totally and
permanently disabled because of an industrial injury suffered while
employed by Salt Lake City.
The ALJ awarded permanent total
disability benefits to Mr. Hansen. Salt Lake City then filed this
Motion For Review, challenging the ALJ's decision on a number of
different grounds.
Because the Commission concludes that Mr.
Hansen has failed to establish that his industrial accident in 1976
caused his now-claimed permanent total disability, the Commission
does not specifically address the other points raised by Salt Lake
City.
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over
this Motion For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah
Code Ann. §35-1-82.53 and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set forth in the
ALJ's decision.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Under Utah's Workers Compensation Act, Mr. Hansen is entitled
to permanent total disability compensation only if he proves that
his 1976 injury caused his now-claimed permanent total disability.
See Utah Code Ann.§ 35-1-67(1); also Large v. Industrial
Commission, 758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah App. 1988).
Other issues
regarding Mr. Hansen's claim are not reached unless he first
satisfies the threshold causation requirement. Zupon v. Industrial
Commission, 860 P.2d 960 (Utah App. 1993).
In considering the issue of causation, the Commission notes
the Social Security Administration's determination that Mr. Hansen
was disabled from work after the 1976 injury.
However, the
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Commission does not know the underlying facts upon which the Social
Security Administration made its award, whether those facts are
supported by the evidence, or whether legal principles appropriate
to workers' compensation were applied by the Social Security
Administration in making its determination. For those reasons, the
Commission does not place a great deal of reliance on the Social
Security determination.1
The Commission also notes that Mr. Hansen received a 16%
permanent partial impairment rating as a result of the 197 6
accident.
That impairment rating has never changed since his
industrial injury.
It is insufficient to prove that the 1976
accident caused Mr. Hansen to be permanently and totally disabled.
Finally, the Commission notes that Mr. Hansen did not actually
return to work after the 1976 accident. However, his failure to
return to work may be attributable to reasons other than his injury
and is therefore given little weight.
Other facts exist which indicate Mr. Hansen's 1976 accident
did not cause permanent total disability. Mr. Hansen's treating
physician released him to return to light duty work during 1977.
Mr. Hansen filed two claims for workers' compensation benefits
within a few years of the 197 6 accident and thus was before the
Commission twice, but neither time did he claim to be permanently
and totally disabled. Shortly after his 1976 accident, Mr. Hansen
began suffering pulmonary problems then other assorted medical
problems, which have been appraised by a medical panel as much more
significant and debilitating than his industrial injury.
As noted above, Mr. Hansen claims that his 197 6 industrial
injury caused permanent total disability as of 1976. The fact that
Mr. Hansen waited 14 years to raise his claim does not reduce his
burden of proof, or shift that burden of proof to his employer.
Had he raised his claim earlier, both parties could have provided
better evidence. Be that is it may, the Commission must make its
decision based on the evidence that is available now. In view of
the record before it, the Commission concludes that Mr. Hansen has
failed to prove his 1976 industrial injury caused his now-claimed
permanent total disability.

While the current version of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 specifically refers to the "sequential
decision making process of the Social Security Administration", no such provision existed in Utah
law at the time of Mr. Hansen's injury.
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Commission denies Mr. Hansen's
claim for permanent total disability compensation.
It is so
ordered.
Dated this /?)

day of May, 1994.

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by
filing a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission within 2 0
days of the date of this Order.
Alternatively, any party may
appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition
For Review with that Court within 3 0 days of the date of this
Order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, Alan Hennebold, certify that I did mail by prepaid first
class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of GERALD R. HANSEN v. SALT LAKE CITY
CORPORATION and EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND. Case Number 90-1056,
on the . ^ 2 % a y of May, 1994, to the following:
Virginius Dabney
DABNEY & DABNEY
350 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

Ray L. Montgomery
Assistant City Attorney
451 South State, Suite 505
Salt Lake City, Utah

^nM^If
Alan Hennebold
General Counsel
Industrial Commission of Utah
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j& a
notice to appoint counsel, Hartford would obviously
have had an opportunity to reactivate its claim before
the elapse of the 20-day period prescribed by Rule 4506(3), rendering any intended motion to dismiss for
failure to prosecute of academic interest only. Cf.
Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc. 571 P.2d 1368, 1369-70
(Utah 1977) (finding court had abused its discretion in
dismissing case for failure to prosecute when party's
motion to dismiss filed concurrently with its answer).
9. Nothing prevents the trial court from receiving
additional memoranda if it wishes to do so. We
merely hold that Hartford was not entided to submit
the additional memorandum as a matter of right.
Hartford may have been more successful in gaining
acceptance of its supplemental memorandum if it had
first sought leave of court. Counsel could have filed
a motion, stating the reasons the information was not
included in the original memorandum, and requested
permission to submit an additional memorandum. Cf.
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(d) (motion to allow supplemental
pleadings, at discretion of court); Utah R. Civ. P.
60(b)(1), (2) (motion for relief from judgment for
excusable neglect or newly discovered evidence); Utah
Code Jud. Admin. R4-501(l)(a) (over-length
memorandum may be submitted with prior leave of
court on ex parte application).
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
COMMERCIAL CARRIERS and Old
Republic Insurance,
Petitioners,
v.
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of
Utah, and Ronny Lyn Judd,
Respondents.
No. 940208-CA
FILED: December 30, 1994
Original Proceeding in this Court
ATTORNEYS:
Anne Swensen and Juliana e P. Blanch, Salt
Lake City, for Petitioners
Eugene C. Miller, Jr., Salt Lake City, for
Respondents
Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Jackson.
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Petitioners Commercial Carriers (Commercial)
and its insurer, Old Republic Insurance, seek
reversal of a decision by the Board of Review of
the Utah Industrial Commission (the Board)
granting worker's compensation benefits to

(Judd), a truck driver wno was injureu m a ngui
at a truck stop motel. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
On May 2 1 , 1992, Commercial assigned Judd
and fellow trucker, Jim Coyle (Coyle), to
transport a truck load of automobiles from
Wentzville, Missouri, to Burlingame, California.
The two men stopped for the night at a motel in
Fort Kearney, Nebraska. They spent several
hours drinking in the motel bar. After the bar
closed, Judd and Coyle encountered two men in
the parking lot near their trucks. Judd and Coyle
told the men to stay away from their trucks, and
the two men fled into a field. Judd and Coyle
pursued the two men into the field, where Judd
was severely beaten by one of the men.
When Commercial refused Judd's request for
worker's compensation benefits, Judd petitioned
the Utah Industrial Commission for a hearing on
his claim. After a hearing, the adrninistrative
law judge (ALT) found that Judd and Coyle met
two women who joined them at the bar to escape
the "harassment" of two younger men, who had
asked the women to dance. The ALJ ultimately
found that the fight that caused Judd's injuries
resulted from personal animosity between Judd
and the two younger men "who were competing
for the attention" of the two women.
Accordingly, the ALJ dismissed Judd's claim
with prejudice.
Judd appealed to the Board. Although the
Board adopted most of the ALJ's findings of
fact, it drew different "inferences" from those
facts. The Board found that Judd and Coyle met
the women at the bar and walked them to their
car when the bar closed. After the women drove
away, the two young men who had been in the
bar suggested to Judd and Coyle that the four of
them buy more beer and drink it in their motel
room. The truckers declined, stating they had to
leave early in the morning.
The Board found
that,
during
the
conversation, the young men also asked if they
could take one of the cars Judd and Coyle were
transporting out for a drive. Judd told the young
men such use was prohibited and warned them
that all of the cars had alarms.
The Board further found that Judd and Coyle
then left the young men and walked to the
parking lot to check their trucks. Afterward,
they walked to a nearby convenience store, but
the store was closed. As they were walking back
to the motel, they observed the two young men
in the parking lot, walking around the parked
cars and trucks. Judd and Coyle walked toward
their trucks and watched the young men from
the shadows.
The young men then approached Judd's and
Coyle's trucks, and one said, "[T]hese must be
the vehicles with the alarms." At that point,
Judd and Coyle confronted the young men and
told them to stay away from their trucks and all
other trucks in the parking lot.
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The two young men nea .into me uciu, mm
Judd and Coyle walked after them.. About thirty
yards into the field, the young men stopped.
One of them beat Judd, who suffered serious
injuries.
Based on those findings, the Board reversed
the ALJ's decision and awarded worker's
compensation benefits to Judd. The Board
concluded that although the women at the bar
joined Judd and Coyle in part to "avoid the
attentions of the two younger men," there was
"no objective evidence" to support the
"hypothesis" that the fight stemmed from
antagonism concerning the two women. Thus,
the Board concluded that the fight and Judd's
injuries "arose out of and in the course o f
Judd's employment.

Commercial claims the Board's findings of
fact are not supported by "substantial evidence,"
as required
by Utah Code
Ann.
§63-46b-16(4)(g) (1989). 1 Commercial argues
that the Board cannot reverse the ALJ's findings
of fact without stating specifically and in detail
the reasons for doing so. We disagree.
"While it is the ALJ who initially hears the
evidence, the Commission is the ultimate fact
finder." Chose v. Industrial Comm'n, 872 P.2d
475, 479 (Utah App. 1994) (citing Virgin v.
Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 803 P.2d
1284, 1287 (Utah App. 1990)); see also U.S.
Steel Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 607 P.2d
807, 810-11 (Utah 1980) (holding that Industrial
Commission is ultimate fact finder). Moreover,
Professor Arthur Larson, in his treatise on
worker's compensation, notes that the decisions
ISSUES ON APPEAL
of the Board, not the ALJ, are deemed
Commercial raises two issues on appeal:
(1) Did the Board correctly determine that conclusive in the majority of states,2 3 Arthur
Compensation
Law
Judd's injuries arose out of and in the course of Larson, Workmen's
his employment under Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45 §80.12(b) (1994).
(1988)?
We therefore review the record before us to
(2) Did the Board err in allowing Judd an determine if substantial evidence supports the
extension of time to appeal the A U ' s denial of Board's factual findings. Substantial evidence is
benefits without a showing of good cause?
more than a "'scintilla' of evidence," though
"iess than the weight of the evidence.'" Grace
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68
We review the Board's findings of fact under (Utah App. 1989) (citation omitted), superseded
section 63-46b-16(4)(g) of the Utah Code, which on other grounds, 819 P.2d 361 (1991).
provides that a factual finding may be disturbed Substantial evidence is that quantum and quality
only if it "is not supported by substantial of relevant evidence that will convince a
evidence when viewed in light of the whole reasonable mind to support a conclusion. First
record before the court." Utah Code Ann. Nat'I Bank v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799
§63-46b-16(4)(g) (1989); King v. Industrial P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990). To determine
Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. whether a finding is supported by substantial
1993). We review an agency's interpretation and evidence, we examine the record as a whole,
application of statutes for correctness, unless the weighing evidence that both supports and
statute in question grants the agency discretion. detracts from the finding. Grace Drilling, 776
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of State Tax P.2d at 68.
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 588-89 (Utah 1991).
Commercial argues that the Board must
Because section 35-1-45 of the Utah Code, explain its reasons for making different findings
which states that compensable injuries must than the ALJ. Commercial claims that this
"arise out of and in the course of employment," court's decision in Adams v. Board of Review of
grants no discretion, we review the Board's the Indus. Comm'n, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App.
decisions for correctness. Walls v. Industrial
1991), requires the Board to adequately detail
Comm'n, 857 P.2d 964, 966-67 (Utah App.
the logic behind a factual finding so that it may
1993) ("[S]ection 35-1-45 (1988) does not
be challenged on appeal. Id. at 5 (the Board's
expressly or impliedly grant the Commission
findings "'should be sufficiently detailed to
discretion to interpret or apply the language of
disclose the steps by which the ultimate factual
that section.").
conclusions, or conclusions of mixed fact and
law, are reached.'") (quoting Milne Truck Lines,
ANALYSIS
Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 1373,
Commercial makes three main arguments on 1378 (Utah 1986)).
appeal. First, Commercial argues that the
However, Commercial's reliance on Adams is
Board's findings are not supported by substantial misplaced. In Adams, a worker at a
evidence and, thus, should be reversed. Second, telemarketing firm claimed a variety of injuries
Commercial claims that the Board erred in stemming from her work, which required
concludmg Judd's injuries were work-related. constant use of the telephone without a headset
Finally, Commercial argues that it was or automatic dialing equipment. Id. at 3. The
substantially prejudiced by the Board's decision ALJ reviewed conflicting medical testimony
to grant Judd an extension of time to appeal the
from doctors and mental health professionals,
ALJ's order. We consider each of these
some of whom thought her injuries were
arguments m turn.
work-related, while others did not. Id. at 3-4.
The ALJ ultimately denied benefits after
UTAH ADVAN(CE REPORTS
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The Industrial Commission affirmed the decision
with a single "finding," stating simply that the
injury was not work-related. Id. at 5. This court
vacated the Commission's order, holding that
the finding was "arbitrary" because it was so
inadequate that it defied meaningful review. Id.
at 7; see Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv)
(1990). Thus, the question addressed by the
Adams court was not whether the findings were
supported by substantial evidence, but rather
whether the findings sufficiently disclosed the
logical process employed to permit meaningful
review.
By contrast, the findings in the instant case are
sufficiently detailed to meet the Adams test. The
Board's findings consist of thirteen paragraphs
carefully detailing the events leading to Judd's
injuries.3 The Board's findings are sufficiently
detailed that we can discern the Board's logical
process; i.e., subsidiary fact findings logically
lead to ultimate fact findings.
Moreover, our review of the record indicates
there was substantial evidence to support the
Board's findings. The Board found that Judd and
Coyle spent several hours in the motel lounge,
during which time they encountered two women,
one of whom was an acquaintance of Judd's.
Further, the Board found that, "to some
degree," the women joined Judd and Coyle to
avoid the two younger men. Nonetheless, the
Board found that the young men later suggested
that Judd and Coyle join them for more beer
after the bar closed. The young men also asked
if they could drive one of the cars Judd and
Coyle were transporting, but Judd told them it
was not allowed. After leaving the bar, Judd and
Coyle walked to the parking lot to check their
trucks. A short time later, Judd and Coyle
observed the two young men approach their
trucks and overheard one of the young men say,
M
[T]hese must be the vehicles with the alarms."
Judd and Coyle confronted the two men, who
fled into the field. The two truckers pursued the
young men about thirty yards into the field, and
Judd was severely injured.
"It is the province of the Board, not appellate
courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and
where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from
the same evidence, it is for the Board to draw
the inferences." Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68.
Thus, the inference that Judd's injuries were
job-related is clearly within the Board's
fact-finding authority.
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of" employment is not synonymous with "caused
by" employment; rather, the cause of the injury
"is something other than the employment; the
employment is thought of more as a condition
out of which the event arises than as the force
producing the event in affirmative fashion." 1
Larson, supra, §6.60, at 3-9 (emphasis in
original). Moreover, "[t]he controlling test
should be 'if the circumstances of the
employment can be fairly said to have elicited
conduct by the employee which results in his
injury.'" Id. §11.11(c), at 3-205 (citation
omitted). Accordingly, when the injuries result
from a fight, the injuries may still be causally
related to the employment "[i]f the fight is
spontaneous and closely entangled with the work
itself." Id. §11.15(a), at 3-243. Because Judd
was injured while attempting to protect his
cargo, we conclude that the fight was "closely
entangled" with his job as a truck driver for
Commercial. Thus, we concur with the Board's
conclusion that Judd's injury arose out of his
employment by Commercial.5
We also agree with the Board's conclusion
that Judd's injuries arose "in the course of" his
employment. An accident arises in the course of
employment when "it occurs while the employee
is rendering service to his employer which he
was hired to do or doing something incidental
thereto, at the time when and the place where he
was authorized to render such service." M & K
Corp., 189 P.2d at 134. Additionally, an injury
arises in the course of employment if it occurs
within the "time, place and circumstances" of
the employment. Walls v. Industrial Comm'n,
857 P.2d 964, 967 (Utah App. 1993); see 1
Larson, supra, §14.00.
Commercial argues that Judd's injuries are not
compensable because they were suffered during
a personal deviation from work. Commercial
relies upon Walls, in which this court held that
a bartender who was injured while helping move
a beer keg several hours after her scheduled
shift was not entitled to compensation. Walls,
857 P.2d at 966.
However, Walls is distinguishable because it
involves an employee who was injured following
a clear break from her employment
responsibilities. -Here, Judd, in his capacity as a
truck driver for Commercial, had genera]
working hours in that he could drive for ten
hours or 540 miles a day. After stopping in Fori
Kearney for the evening, Judd and Coyle
II. Work-related Injuries
decided to relax and drink beer for several hours
Having ruled on the adequacy and in the motel lounge. Nonetheless, when the ba]
substantiality of the factual findings, we turn closed, the two checked their trucks in order t<
next to the question of whether these facts ensure the cargo was safe. When the}
establish that Judd's injuries "arose out of and in discovered the two young men milling aroun<
the course of his employment."4
the trucks, Judd and Coyle chased them away.
The Board found Judd's injuries "arose out Judd's injuries were a direct result of his attemp
of" his employment. We agree. Injuries are to protect his cargo, not a personal deviatio
deemed to arise out of employment when there from work.
is a "causal relationship" between the injury and
Moreover, it is reasonable that an employe
the employment. M & K Corp. v. Industrial should feel some responsibility to protect his 0
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

her employer's property. See Martinez v.
Workers' Comp. App. Bd., 544 P.2d 1350,1352
(Cal. 1976) (church worker who was injured
while attempting to prevent theft of beer from
his employer is entitled to
worker's
compensation). In this case, it was reasonable
that Judd would attempt to preempt potential
vandals rather than simply notifying police after
the vandalism had occurred. Judd's concerns
about the intentions of the two young men were
especially understandable in light of the interest
the young men had expressed in taking one of
the cars for a "joy ride."
Accordingly, we conclude that the Board did
not err in determining Judd's injuries "arose out
of and in the course of his employment." Also,
Judd was responsible for delivering his cargo
safely to its ultimate destination. That job was
necessarily punctuated by rest stops, but those
stops did not terminate his duty to protect the
cargo from harm.

Although some of the Board's findings were a
odds with those of the ALJ, the. Board is th<
ultimate fact finder, and it was within it
authority in adopting different findings. Further
we find the Board was correct in concluding tha
Judd's injuries "arose out of and in the cours
o f his employment for Commercial. Hi
injuries were, as the Board ruled, "closel.
entangled" with his work responsibilities. W<
also find it reasonable that Judd acted to protec
his employer's property. Finally, we conclud
that Commercial's claim that the Boar
committed prejudicial error by granting
thirty-day extension to Judd for challenging th
ALJ's ruling is without merit.
Accordingly, we affirm.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
WE CONCUR:
James Z. Davis, Judge
Norman H. Jackson, Judge

III. Judd's Motion for Review
Commercial argues that the Board erred in
granting Judd a thirty-day extension of time to
appeal the A U ' s ruling without requiring Judd
to show good cause for the extension. See Utah
Code Ann. §63^6b-l(9) (1989) ("Nothing in
this chapter may be interpreted to restrict a
presiding officer, for good cause shown, from
lengthening or shortening any time period
prescribed in this chapter"). Moreover,
Commercial argues that this court should reverse
under Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii)
(1989), which requires reversal if a party has
been substantially prejudiced by an action that is
contrary to the agency's prior practice.
Commercial cites Maverik Country Stores v.
Industrial Commission, 860 P.2d 944 (Utah
App. 1993), as support for this argument.
We find Commercial's argument unpersuasive.
First, Maverik is distinguishable because the
request for an extension was filed after the
deadline. Id. at 946. Conversely, Judd filed his
request for a continuance one day before the
cut-off. Second, Commercial did not claim in its
motion opposing the extension that it would be
substantially prejudiced by an extension. Utah
Code Ann. §63^6b-16(4)(h)(iii). Without a
showing of substantial prejudice, Commercial's
motion was without merit. Moreover, a claim of
substantial prejudice would be unavailing to
Commercial because the test for substantial
prejudice is not, as Commercial claims, the fact
that it received an unfavorable result; rather, the
test is whether Commercial was given full and
fair consideration of the issues. See Ashton v.
Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987). There
is nothing to indicate the Board failed to fully
and fairly consider Commercial's position.
Thus, there was no prejudicial error.

1. In challenging the Board's factual findings, a par
is required to marshal all of the evidence in support <
the Board's findings, then demonstrate that t\
findings are not supported by substantial evidenc
Johnson v. Board ofReview, 842 P.2d 910,912 (Ut
App. 1992). In the instant case, Commercial's effoi
at marshalling the evidence fall short of th
requirement. In effect, Commercial selective
presented those findings that support its position ai
omitted findings that support Judd's position. F
example, Commercial did not mention that the t\
young men suggested that Judd and Coyle join the
for more beer drinking after the lounge close
Commercial also failed to state that Judd and Co)
had checked their trucks after leaving the bar. Tl
evidence is important because it tends to support t
Board's findings that the fight and Judd's injur
resulted not from personal antipathy, but from Jud«
attempt to safeguard his cargo.
2. Only seven states—Florida, Pennsylvan
Oklahoma, Arizona, Michigan, Colorado, a
Kentucky—and the Longshoreman's Act attach
presumption of conclusiveness to the ALJ's
referee's findings. 3 Arthur Larson, Workme,
Compensation Law §80.12(c)(l)-(8) (1994).
3. Although it is not incumbent on the Board, as i
ultimate fact finder, to explain its reasons
reversing the ALJ, we note that the Board nonethel
states that it simply finds no "objective evidence
support" the^hypothesis that Judd's beating resul
from a fight over women rather than a fight over
truck and cars."
4. As Professor Larson notes, the "arising out o r ;
the "in the course" of provisions are usually regar
as separate legal tests, each of which must be i
before compensation can be awarded. 1 Lars
supra, §6 10, at 3-3. This would appear to be the c
in Utah, which at one time was, according to Lars
the only state in which a worker was awar
compensation for an injury "arising out of or in
course of employment." Id. at 3-2 (citing Utah C
Ann. §35-1-45 (1953)) (emphasis added). The sta
has since been amended to state that compens.
injuries are those "arising out of and in the cours
his employment." Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45 (l c
(emphasis added).

CONCLUSION
We conclude that the Board's factual findings
concerning the circumstances of Judd's injuries
were supported by substantial evidence.
ADVANCE REPORTS
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factual findings underlying the Board's conclusion on
this point, it does not attack the legal conclusion itself.
Thus, we need not consider it further.
6. Commercial argues that by confronting the two
men and chasing them into the field, Judd violated
company rules, which require a trucker to
immediately report vandalism to the police. However,
this contention was directly contradicted by testimony
of Commercial's terminal manager, who told the ALJ
that "I don't believe that we have ever instructed"
truckers what to do when someone is only attempting
to vandalize their trucks.
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Alicia LARSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Marc LARSON,
Defendant and Appellee.
No. 930550-CA
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Third District, Summit County
The Honorable David S. Young
ATTORNEYS:
John D. Sheaffer, Jr., Salt Lake City, for
Appellant
Ellen May cock, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
Kathryn D. Kendell, Salt Lake City, for
amicus curiae American Civil Liberties
Union
Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Wilkins.
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
ORME, Associate Presiding Judge:
Alicia Larson appeals the trial court's order
modifying the child custody and visitation
provisions of a divorce decree. She also
challenges the trial court's decision not to award
her costs and attorney fees incurred in contesting
the modification of the divorce decree initiated
by her ex-husband. We reverse the trial court's
ruling modifying the divorce decree, but affirm
its decision not to award costs and attorney fees.
FACTS
After nine years of marriage, Alicia and
Marc Larson were divorced on April 29, 1992.
The marriage produced three children, the oldest
of whom was eight and the youngest of whom
was five at the time the court modified the
divorce decree. Prior to her marriage, Alicia

During the marriage and at the time oi uic
divorce, Alicia was a homemaker, not otherwise
employed outside the home, and Marc owned
and operated a physical therapy clinic in Park
City, Utah.
The decree of divorce incorporated the parties'
stipulation and property settlement agreement
and provided, in part, that Marc and Alicia
maintain joint legal custody of the children, with
physical custody to be with Alicia. Marc was
awarded extensive rights of visitation, including
two-and-one-half weekends per month, extended
summer visits, and an equal share of time with
the children during the holidays.
The parties were ordered to cooperate in
fostering and maintaining each other's
relationship with their children and to inform
one another of important issues in the children's
lives to facilitate joint decision-making.
Consistent with this general mandate was the
specific requirement that each party was to give
the other a minimum of thirty days written
notice prior to relocating from the Park City
area.
The parties and their children have lived in
Park City since 1989. Alicia and the children
continued to reside together in Park City
following the divorce, as did Marc in a separate
home. In the summer of 1992, Alicia attended a
workshop in Oregon to receive instruction in
glass fusion, an advanced form of stained-glass
art. During this workshop, Alicia met Doug
Pomeroy, a glass fusion artist and an instructor
at the workshop. Subsequently, Alicia and Doug
made plans to marry and thereafter live together
with the Larson children in Doug's home in
Corvallis, Oregon. In October 1992, Alicia
notified Marc, by letter, that she intended to
marry Doug Pomeroy and move to Corvallis
with the children.
On November 6, 1992, Marc filed a petition
to modify the custody provisions of the divorce
decree. Marc filed the petition because he was
concerned that the move to Oregon would not be
in the children's best interest, as it would inhibit
his ability to maintain a parental relationship
with his children, disrupt their religious training,
and remove them from their friends and
relatives. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial
court granted Marc'-s* petition to modify the
divorce decree. The court found that it was in
the best interests of the children to remain in the
Park City area and ordered that if Alicia moved
from Summit County, Utah, physical custody of
the children would thereupon be transferred to
Marc, and Alicia would then have reasonable
and liberal rights of visitation. The trial court
also determined that the parties had the ability to
pay their own costs and attorney fees.
Alicia Larson appeals, raising the following
issues: (1) Was there sufficient evidence to
support the trial court's findings? (2) Did the
trial court abuse its discretion in granting Marc's
petition to modify? (3) Did the trial court abuse
its discretion in failing to award costs and
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question of whether the officers acted in an
objectively reasonable manner in reliance
on the search warrant. At the very least,
the trial court should be invited to determine factually if the officer knew that information he supplied in the affidavit was
false, or whether he "would have known
[it] was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth." Leon, 468 U.S. at 923,
104 S.Ct. at 3421.
After we have decided the narrow issue
presented in an interlocutory appeal, we
should allow the case to proceed in the trial
court "To the extent an appellate court
supersedes the trial court in the decision of
factual issues and the application of law to
fact, it undermines the authority of the
tribunals through which the legal system
speaks directly to those who invoke the
legal process for resolution of their controversies." Section 3.11, American Bar Association, Standards Relating to Appellate
Courts, 1977 Edition. We must be very
careful not to usurp the authority and responsibility of our trial courts.
Due to the intermediate and limited nature of this appeal, I would reverse the
suppression order and remand the case for
further proceedings in the trial court.

John W. ZUPON, Petitioner,
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Employers' Reinsurance Fund; Uninsured Employers' Fund; and Kaiser
Steel Corporation, Respondents.
No. 920569-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Sept 14, 1993.
Workers'
compensation
claimant
sought review of Industrial Commission's

decision denying his claim for permanent
total disability benefits. The Court of Appeals, Billings, P.J., held that Commission?
decision was supported by substantial evidence.
Affirmed.
1. Workers* Compensation 3=>1856
Failure of workers' compensation
claimant to raise claim that he was entitled
to compensation for an additional 50% permanent partial disability at original hearing
precluded any review of such claim on appeal.
2. Workers' Compensation @=>1937
Industrial Commission's comment, that
administrative law judge's findings were
supported by substantial evidence, represented at most harmless error since substantial evidence standard was simply recited in response to an unclear nonspecific
challenge and the substantive, factual discussion of the case applied the necessary
preponderance of the evidence standard.
3. Workers' Compensation @=»847
"Odd lot doctrine" allows Industrial
Commission to find permanent total disability when relatively small percentage of impairment caused by industrial accident is
combined with other factors to render
claimant unable to obtain employment.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
4. Workers' Compensation <3=>847
To qualify as recipient of benefits under odd lot doctrine, employee must prove
that she can no longer perform duties required in her occupation and must establish, through cooperation with Division of
Vocational Rehabilitation, that she cannot
be rehabilitated.
5. Workers' Compensation ®=>847
After employee seeking benefits under
odd lot doctrine has shown that rehabilitation is not possible, employer has opportunity to prove existence of steady work that
employee can perform; the work the employer establishes is available must take
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consideration all relevant factors, inng employee's education, mental caand age, as well as physical limitaWorkers' Compensation ®=>1421
Before workers' compensation claimnt can acquire benefits under the odd lot
ne, claimant must establish compenble industrial injury by preponderance of
evidence.
|i Workers' Compensation «=»1492
Proving medical causation between inlustrial accident and disability for which
orkers' compensation claimant seeks comation is necessary component for repvery.
Workers' Compensation @=>1716, 1939.11(5)
Medical causation is issue of fact and
ourt of Appeals reviews this determinaon of Industrial Commission under subotial evidence standard. U.C.A.1953,
[63-46b-16(4)(g).

Virginius Dabney, Dabney & Dabney,
P.C., Robert Bentley (Argued), Salt Lake
City, for petitioner.
Edwin C. Barnes (Argued), Clyde, Pratt
& Snow, P.C., Salt Lake City, for Uninsured Employers' and Kaiser Steel.
Benjamin A. Sims, Gen. Counsel, Salt
Lake City, for respondent Industrial Commission of Utah.
Erie V. Boorman, Salt Lake City, for
respondent Employers' Reinsurance Fund.
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and ORME,
JJ.
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
John W. Zupon filed this Petition for
Review from an order of the Industrial
Commission denying his claim for permanent total disability benefits. We affirm.
BACKGROUND

In 1975, petitioner was employed by Kaiser Steel as an electrician. On August 7 of
that year, he felt a pain in his back while
lifting an acetylene tank at work. In February of 1977, an administrative law judge
found petitioner had a ten percent permaWorkers' Compensation <s»847
nent physical impairment and was entitled
For odd lot doctrine to apply, Industrito twenty-six weeks of temporary total
e s Commission had to determine that there
compensation and thirty-one weeks of perj*yas medical causation between claimant's
manent partial compensation. The ALJ
¥
[industrial accident and his claimed perma- based his ruling on the opinion of a medical
it "total" disability and this issue was panel which found petitioner had total
•t controlled by administrative law physical impairment of sixty percent. The
fudge's (ALT) determination approximately panel, however, found only ten percent of
15 years earlier that claimant's industrial the total physical impairment attributable
ident caused permanent 'partial" dis- to the industrial accident. It attributed the
and AU's determination that there balance of petitioner's impairment to a
medical causation did not prevent Com- preexisting condition known as ankylosingion from reaching different conclusion spondylitis, a degenerative disease of the
[*years later based on new medical evi- spine. The panel concluded the ten percent
nce. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-78(1).
impairment was attributable to the industrial accident because there was "a one-inIt Workers' Compensation <s=>1636
six chance that the ankylosingspondylitis
was
aggravated by the lumbar back strain
^Substantial evidence supported Induson
the
basis of the progression of the x-ray
Commission's determination that
changes."
leers' compensation claimant did not esblish that his industrial accident was
In June of 1976, petitioner applied for
iical cause of his claimed total perma- social security disability benefits. His iniQt disability.
tial application, application for a rehearing,
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and application on appeal were all denied.
Following a court order obtained to acquire
review of unspecified new evidence, petitioner had a new hearing in May of 1978.
In June of 1978, the Social Security Administration's ALT granted petitioner benefits.
The ALJ ruled petitioner's total disability
was not a result of his back problems but
rather a result of arthritis in his hands that
became more severe starting in January of
1977. A doctor who assessed petitioner in
1981 to determine whether his Social Security benefits should continue noted: "I
think this patient's symptoms are way out
of proportion to the objective findings
which are presented."
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed an application for permanent total disability
based on his 1975 accident. A hearing was
held and the ALT concluded petitioner had
failed to establish the necessary medical
causation between his 1975 industrial accident and his permanent total disability.
The ALJ based her conclusion on two rationales: First, the medical evidence demon1. In his reply brief, petitioner challenges, under
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12(6)(c) (1989), the
sufficiency of the Industrial Commission's findings of fact in its order denying review. We
note the facts in this case are undisputed and in
such a case the failure to disclose a specific
subsidiary finding is not fatal to the agency's
decision. See Adams v. Board of Review, 821
P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App.1991). Although we do not
remand here because of the nature of the record, we strongly encourage the Industrial Commission to clearly articulate its factual findings
in all cases to enhance our ability "to conduct a
meaningful review." Id. at 4.
2. Petitioner also argues the Commission erred
when it rejected his claim, made for the first
time in his Motion for Review, that he deserved
compensation for an additional fifty percent
permanent partial disability. The application
for a hearing does not specify such a claim.
The ALJ, in a response letter, indicates that such
a claim was not presented at the hearing. Although the Commission rejected the claim based
on the eight year statute of limitations which
had expired more than seven years before petitioner raised this claim in his motion for review, we do not consider Mr. Zupon's claim
because his failure to raise the claim at the
original hearing precludes any review on appeal. See Ashcroft v. Industrial Comm'n, 855
P.2d 267, 268-69 (Utah App.1993).
3. Petitioner also claims we should remand the
case for factual findings because the Commis-

strated it was petitioner's arthritic condition, which was unrelated to the industrial
injury, that caused petitioner's inability to
work; Second, even if ankylosingspondylitis contributed to petitioner's inability to
work, the industrial accident did not cause
the disease and "only questionably aggravated i t "
On August 3, 1992, the Industrial Commission issued an order affirming the
AU's order and denying petitioner's motion for review. Petitioner brings a petition for review to this court from the Commission's order.1
[1,2] On appeal, petitioner argues the
Commission erred by failing to apply the
"odd lot" doctrine to his situation and
award him permanent total disability benefits.2 Petitioner further claims the Commission's determination of no medical causation was contrary to its prior determination of ten percent causation and therefore
in error.3 The Commission responds that
sion applied the substantial evidence test rather
than a preponderance of the evidence standard.
See Ashcroft v. Industrial Comm'n, 855 P.2d 267,
269 (Utah App.1993). In Ashcroft, the Industrial
Commission held petitioner had failed to meet
his burden of proof under the substantial evidence standard. Furthermore, the only evaluation of the evidence the Commission did was
under the substantial evidence standard. We
noted substantial evidence review is not the role
of the Commission, a trier of fact. Id.
The case at hand is significantly different.
Here, the Commission ruled the ALJ's findings
were supported by substantial evidence. The
order found the respondents had established no
medical causation by "substantial evidence."
This is the exact opposite of Ashcroft. A substantial evidence standard represents a higher
burden of proof and thus the comment represents at most a harmless error.
Furthermore, in the order denying review, the
Commission systematically responded directly
to the challenges the petitioner asserted to the
ALJ's findings. In response to the petitioner's
challenge that the ALJ improperly found no
medical causation, the Commission recited the
evidence supporting medical causation and concluded "the medical records do not establish a
medical causal connection between applicant's
August 7, 1975 industrial injury and his permanent total disability." As opposed to Ashcroft,
where substantial evidence was the only comment on the evidence by the Commission, in
this case the substantial evidence standard is

ZUPON v. INDUSTRIAL COMTV OF UTAH

Utah

963

Cite M 860 P.2d 960 (Utah App. 1993)

the odd lot doctrine is inapplicable because
medical causation must be established prior
to the doctrine's application and the Commission properly found petitioner's industrial injury did not cause his permanent
total disability.
ODD LOT DOCTRINE
[3-5] The odd lot doctrine "allows the
Commission to find permanent total disability when a relatively small percentage of
impairment caused by an industrial accident is combined with other factors to render the claimant unable to obtain employment."
Zimmerman
v.
Industrial
Comm'n, 785 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah App.
1989). See also Marshall v. Industrial
Comm'n, 681 P.2d 208, 212-13 (Utah 1984)
(discussing odd lot doctrine). To qualify as
a recipient of benefits under the odd lot
doctrine, an employee must first "prove
that he or she can no longer perform the
duties required in his or her occupation."
Zimmerman, 785 P.2d at 1131. Next, the
employee, through cooperation with the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, must
"establish that he or she cannot be rehabilitated." Id. After the employee has shown
that rehabilitation is not possible, the employer has the opportunity "to prove the
existence of steady work the employee can
perform." Id. The work the employer establishes is available must take into consideration all relevant factors "including the
employee's education, mental capacity, and
age" as well as physical limitations. Id.4
[6,7] Before a claimant can acquire
benefits under the odd lot doctrine, however, the claimant must establish a compensable industrial injury. Zimmerman, 785
^2d at 1132. " '[U]nless the claimant has
suffered a compensable industrial injury,
Ihe [odd lot] doctrine is inapplicable no
iaatter how compelling the other factors.'"
^& (quoting Ortiz v. Industrial Comm'n,

766 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Utah App.1989)) (modifications in original). The claimant must
prove the compensability of an injury by a
preponderance of the evidence. Ashcroft
v. Industrial Comm'n, 855 P.2d 267, 269
(Utah App. 1993). Proving medical causation between the industrial accident and the
disability for which the claimant seeks compensation is a necessary component for recovery. Allen v. Industrial Comm 'n, 729
P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986).
MEDICAL CAUSATION
[8] Medical causation is an issue of fact
and we review the determination of the
Industrial Commission under the substantial evidence standard. See King v. Industrial Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah
App.1993); Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b16(4)(g) (1989). "Medical causation demands that petitioner 'prove [his] disability
is medically the result of an exertion or
injury that occurred during a work-related
activity.'"
Willardson v. Industrial
Comm'n, 856 P.2d 371, 375 (Utah App.
1993) (quoting Allen v.
Industrial
Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986))
(footnote omitted).
Petitioner claims the Commission committed error in ignoring its prior decision
that ten percent of petitioner's permanent
partial impairment was attributable to the
industrial accident. This argument misapprehends the impact of the Commission's
earlier decision.
[9] For the odd-lot doctrine to apply,
the Commission must first determine there
is medical causation between the petitioner's 1975 industrial accident and his now
claimed permanent total disability. That
is a different question from, and not controlled in any way by, the determination
that his industrial accident caused a permanent partial disability. Furthermore, the
determination that there was medical cau-

'%*£•"

jf*simply recited in response to an unclear nonspej^cific challenge. The substantive, factual discusvision of the case applies the necessary preponderance of the evidence standard.

m
4. Although petitioner argues that application of
I -the odd lot analysis indicates he is entitled to
benefits, it is clear from the record there was, at

the very least, never any rehabilitation evaluation ordered. See Hardman v. Salt Lake City
Fleet Management, 725 P.2d 1323, 1328 (Utah
1986) (remanding for rehabilitation determination). See also Norton v. Industrial Comm'n,
728 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah 1986) (per curiam)
(remanding to 2^scss disability and provide employer opportunity to prove existence of work).
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sation in the 1977 hearing did not prevent
the Commission from reaching a different
conclusion based on new medical evidence
at the 1992 hearing. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-78(1) (Supp.1993). While the 1977
decision was some evidence supporting
medical causation for the new permanent
total claim brought sixteen years after the
industrial accident, the A U and the Commission properly reassessed all the medical
evidence in the record.
[10] Based primarily on the Social Security Administration's determination that petitioner's total disability was a result of the
arthritis in the petitioner's hands, the Commission found there was no medical causation between the 1975 industrial injury and
his permanent total disability claim.5
Thus, the Commission's determination petitioner did not establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that the 1975 industrial
accident was a medical cause of his now
claimed total permanent disability is supported by substantial, undisputed evidence
in the record. We therefore affirm.
CONCLUSION
The Industrial Commission's determination that petitioner failed to establish his
1977 industrial injury was a medical cause
of his now claimed permanent total disability is supported by substantial evidence.
We therefore affirm the denial of permanent total disability benefits.
ORME and BENCH, JJ., concur.

5. The AU and the Commission discussed an
alternative basis for the rejection of petitioner's
claim. Based on the medical panel's assessment
that there was only a one-in-six chance petitioner's back injury aggravated his spine disease, the
ALT questioned the validity of the earlier AU's
finding of medical causation. The AU noted a
one-in-six, or 16 and 66 one-hundredths percent,
chance is significantly less than the 50 percent
required under the preponderance of the evidence standard. Furthermore, the AU explicitly and completely reviewed the substantial, undisputed medical evidence in the case. The
Commission also affirmed the AU's finding of
no medical causation on this basis and recited

The PROMARK GROUP, INC., a Colorado corporation formerly known as
Component Sales, Inc., and Utah Component Sales, Inc., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
HARRIS CORPORATION, Defendant
and Appellee.
No. 920173-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Sept. 17, 1993.

Sales representative sued corporation
seeking to recover damages for lost commissions and lost value of exclusive sales
territory due to improper termination of
agreement by corporation. The District
Court, Third District, Salt Lake County,
Michael R. Murphy, J., granted corporation's motion for summary judgment.
Sales representative appealed. The Court
of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that: (1) corporation's improper attempt to make termination of agreement retroactive in violation
of agreement did not invalidate termination
itself but only affected timing of effective
date of actual termination, and (2) sales
representative was not entitled to receive
from corporation any commissions in view
of its settlement with subrepresentative for
breach of subrepresentation agreement
which expressly premised dollar amount of
settlement on compensation under subreundisputed facts in the record to support its
conclusion. The commission noted: (1) The
medical records show no treatment for back
pain after 1976; (2) The doctors who treated
petitioner immediately after the accident noted
he complained of pain and limited use of much
of his body, "suggesting that the applicant was
experiencing symptoms of progressive arthritis
of the spine, shoulders, elbows, and hands;" (3)
A doctor in 1976 concluded petitioner could
return to work; and (4) A doctor evaluating
petitioner for Social Security Benefits in 1981
concluded petitioner's symptoms were out of
proportion with the doctor's objective analysis

APPENDIX

"D"

35-1-67. Permanent total disability—Amount of payments—Vocational
rehabilitation—Procedure and payments.—In cases of permanent total disability the employee shall receive 66%% of his average weekly wages at
the time of the injury, but not more thau a maximum of 85% of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the injur.v per week and not less
than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent wife and $5 for
each dependent minor child under the age of eighteen }rears, up to a
maximum of four such dependent minor children not to exceed the average
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week.
However, in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or
its insurance carrier be required to pay such weekly compensation payments for more than 312 weeks; and provided further, that a finding by
the commission of permanent total disability shall in all cases be tentative
and not final until such time as the following proceedings have been had:
Where the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently and
totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of
Utah refer such empio.vee to the division of vocational rehabilitation under
the state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall be the
duty of the commission to order paid to such vocational rehabilitation
division, out of that special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1), not
to exceed $1,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of such employee; the rehabilitation and training of such employee shall generally
follow the practice applicable under section 35-1-60, and relating to the
rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries. If and when the
division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education
certifies to the industrial commission of Utah and in writing that such
employee has fully co-operated with the division of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division
the employee may not be rehabilitated, then the commission shall order
that there be paid to such employee weekly benefits at the rate of 66%%
of his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than
a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the
injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5
for a dependent wife and $5 for each dependent minor child under the
age of eighteen years, up to a maximum of fourf such dependent minor
children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the
time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly
wage at the time of the injury per week out of that special fund provided
for by section 35-1-68 (1), for such period of time beginning with the
time that the payments (as in this section provided) to be made by the
employer or its insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of
the employee. No employee, however, shall be entitled to any such benefits
if he fails or refuses to co-operate with the division of vocational rehabilitation as set forth herein.-

Commencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are permanently and totally
disabled and on that date or prior thereto were receiving compensation
benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1) shall
be paid compensation benefits at the rate of $60 per week.
Commencing July 1,1975, all persons who were permanently and totally
disabled on or before March 5, 1949, and were receiving compensation
benefits and continue to receive such benefits shall be paid compensation
benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1) at a rate
sufficient to bring their weekly benefit to $60 when combined with employer
or insurance carrier compensation payments.
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of
the vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon
the commission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity to
be heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function.
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both
arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall
constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to
the provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent total
disability shall be required in such instances: m all ither cases, however,
and where there has been rehabilitation effected b u t where there is some
loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial permanent
disabilit} r .
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to
pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of
function, in excess of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time
of the injury per week for 312 weeks
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ment of any artificial means or appliance for the reason of breakage, wear and tear, deterioration, or obsolescence
(5) The commission may, in unusual cases, order
the payment of additional sums for burial expenses or
to provide for artificial means or appliances as the
commission considers just and proper
1994
35-1-82,35-1-82.51.

Repealed.

1965, 1987

35-1-82.52. Appointment of l a w j u d g e s — P o w e r
and authority.

(1) The commission shall appoint one or more administrative law judges
(2) The commission or any administrative law
judge may call, preside at, and conduct hearings and
adjudicative proceedings
(3) (a) The commission and any administrative
law judge may issue subpoenas
(b) Failure to respond to a properly issued subpoena may result in a contempt citation and offenders may be punished as provided in Section
78-32-15
1987
35-1-82.53. R e v i e w of administrative order —
Finality of commission's order.

(1) Any party m interest who is dissatisfied with
the order entered by an administrative law judge
may seek review of that order with the commission by
complying with the commission's rules governing
that review
(2) The order of the commission on review is final,
unless set aside by the Court of Appeals
1988
35-1-82.54,35-1-82.55.

Repealed.

1988

35-1-82.56. Notice t o parties of order o r award.
All parties in interest shall be given due notice of
the entry of any administrative law judge's orde*- or
any order or award of the commission The mailing of
the copy of said order or award to the last known
address shown in the files of the commission of any
party in interest and to the attorneys or agents of
record in the case, if any, shall be deemed to be notice
of such order
1975
35-1-83 to 35-1-85. R e p e a l e d .

1987

35-1-85.1. D e p o s i t i o n s of w i t n e s s e s authorized.
The commission or any party to a proceeding under
this act may cause depositions of witnesses to be
taken as m civil actions
1965
35-1-86. Court of A p p e a l s m a y r e v i e w commission's actions.
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review,
reverse, or annul any order of the commission, or to
suspend or delay the operation or execution of any
order
1988
35-1-87. Attorneys' fees.
In all cases coming before the Industrial Commission m which attorneys have been employed, the commission is vested with full power to regulate and fix
the fees of such attorneys
1953
35-1-88. R u l e s o f e v i d e n c e a n d p r o c e d u r e before commission and hearing examiner
— Admissible evidence.
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner
shall be bound by the usual common-law or statutory
rules of evidence, or by any technical or formal rules
of procedure, other than as herein provided or as
adopted by the commission pursuant to this act The
commission may make its investigation in such man-

35-1-92

ner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain
the substantial rights of the parties and to carry out
justly the spirit of the Workmen's Compensation Act
The commission may receive as evidence and use as
proof of any fact m dispute all evidence deemed material and relevant including, but not limited to the
following
(a) Depositions and sworn testimony presented
in open hearings
(b) Reports of attending or- examining physicians, or of pathologists.
(c) Reports of investigators appointed by the
commission
(d) Reports of employers, including copies of
time sheets, book accounts or other records
(e) Hospital records in the case of an injured or
diseased employee
1965
35-1-89. Injuries to minors.
A minor shall be deemed sui juris for the purposes
of this title, and no other person shall have any cause
of action or nght to compensation for an injury to
such minor workman, but in the event of the award of
a lump sum of compensation to a minor employee,
such sum shall be paid only to his legally appointed
guardian
1953
35-1-90. Void agreements b e t w e e n e m p l o y e r s
and employees.
No agreement by an employee to waive his rights
to compensation under this title shall be valid No
agreement by an employee to pa> any portion of the
premium paid by his employer shall be valid Any
employer who deducts any portion of such premium
from the wages or salary of any employee entitled to
the benefits of this title is guilty of a misdemeanor,
and shall be fined not more than $100 for each such
offense
1953
35-1-91. Physical examinations.
Any employee claiming the nght to receive compensation under this title may be required by the
commission, or its medical examiner, to submit himself for medical examination at any time, and from
time to time, at a place reasonably convenient for
such employee, and such as may be provided by the
rules of the commission If such employee refuses to
submit to any such examination, or obstructs the
same, his right to have his claim for compensation
considered, if his claim is pending before the commission, or to receive any payments for compensation
theretofore granted, shall be suspended during the
period of such refusal or obstruction
1953
35-1-92. Autopsy in death c a s e s — Authority o f
commission — Certified pathologist —
Public record — Attending physicians
— Penalty for refusal to permit — Liability.
On the filing of a claim for compensation for death
within the provisions of this act where, in the opinion
of the commission it is necessary to accurately and
scientifically ascertain the cause of death, an autopsy
may be ordered by a majority of the commission and
shall be made by a person designated by the commission The commission shall determine who shall pay
the charge of the certified pathologist making the autopsy Any person interested may designate a duly
licensed physician to attend such autopsy, and the
findings of the certified pathologist performing the
autopsy shall be filed with the commission and shall
be a public record All proceedings for compensation
shall be suspended upon refusal of a claimant or
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(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of
fact and law and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings,
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this
section.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-15, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25; 1990,
ch. 132, § 1.

Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23,1990, added the exception at the end of Subsection (l)(a).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ant to Subsection (l)(a) of this section. In re
Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert,
denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).
The only appellate jurisdiction statutorily
delegated to the district court is to review informal agency adjudicative proceedings. State
v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).

ANALYSIS

Final agency action.
Function of district court.
Right to judicial proceeding.
Cited.
Final agency action.
Industrial Commission's determination of
wrongful discharge was not final, and so not
reviewable under this section, because the
commission and the parties had not resolved
the issue of reimbursement for lost wages and
benefits as required by § 34-28-19(2). Parkdale
Care Ctr. v. Frandsen, 837 P.2d 989 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).
Function of district court
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final
agency decisions through formal adjudicative
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore,
the district court will no longer function as intermediate appellate court except to review informal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursu-

Right to judicial proceeding.
District court erred in declining a de novo
review of a dentist's claim to licensure by reciprocity, where there had been no proceeding on
his application that was sufficiently judicial in
nature, and he had not yet had the licensing
agency's action reviewed in a "trial-type hearing." Kirk v. Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing, 815 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991).
Cited in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance
v. Board of State Lands & Forestry, 830 P.2d
233 (Utah 1992); Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 52 (Ct.
App. 1993).

63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
309
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(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute,
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26.
Cross-References. — Review of proceed-

ings before State Tax Commission, jurisdiction
and standard, §§ 59-1-601, 59-1-610

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Agency action
Applicability of section.
Arbitrary action.
Conflicting evidence.
Factual findings.
Final order.
Function of district court.
Jurisdictional hearing by board.
Prior practice.
Review.
Standard of review.
—Interpretation of statutory term.
—Questions of law.
Substantial evidence test.
Substantial prejudice.
Whole record test.
Cited.
Agency action.
Whether the Industrial Commission acted
contrary to its own rule is governed by Subsection (4)(h)(ii) of this section Ashcroft v. Indus-

trial Comm'n, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah Ct App
1993).
Applicability of section.
Subsection (4) deals with judicial relief, not
judicial review. It does not affect the degree of
deference an appellate court grants to an
agency's decision. Rather, it ensures that relief
should not be granted when, although the
agency committed error, the error was harmless. Morton Intl, Inc. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).
Arbitrary action.
Industrial commission's denial of occupational disease disability benefits based upon a
solitary finding regarding the ultimate issue of
causation failed to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions
of mixed fact and law, were reached, and therefore rendered the action arbitrary. Adams >
Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct App
1991).
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